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The main goal of this master’s thesis was to create an Internet of Things testbed for
doing evaluation of different security aspects of the test network. Mainly because the
number of devices that come under the realm of IoT is constantly growing, and hence
the need for strong security features for said devices is also becoming more and more
important. Historically, IoT devices lack complex security features mostly because of the
heterogeneity, cost-effectiveness and subsequently the low computational or processing
power. 5G is right around the corner, and the requirements that come with 5G compliant
IoT use cases are complex and security critical. Hence, it is essential that we have an even
deeper understanding of what IoT security really entails.
There were two main objectives for this research. The first was to set up the test network.
During the configuration of the network, there were several factors that were kept in
mind. Firstly, the network had to expose different surfaces of attacks, including wired
and wireless interfaces. The network had to have multiple wireless protocols in use so
that vulnerabilities associated with multiple technologies could be explored. The network
also had to be a close emulation of a real-world IoT system with features replicating both
consumer use and industrial deployment.
The second was to test and evaluate the network’s security settings, using different attack
vectors across multiple attack surfaces to find vulnerabilities. Within the limited timeline
for the thesis, we explored multiple ways how different elements of the network can be
compromised. For the explored vulnerabilities, appropriate mitigation techniques were
also suggested.
Additional preventive measures were also adopted by observing and analysing what kind
of attacks the network was being subject to from the internet. Some future prospects have
also been suggested for the testbed to enable a more adaptive and flexible test environment
that is scalable and can offer security researchers a robust platform for present and future
IoT environments.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Since the very beginning, the vision of Internet of Things is ever expanding, including
applications like smart transportation, smart healthcare, smart cities industrial automation,
etc. The idea of having ‘things’ connected to the internet has gained a lot of popularity in
the last decade or so. So much so that predictions say that by 2021, there will be about
25 billion IoT devices in use, all over the world [1]. However, a significant part of the
conversation, when it comes to IoT, has been the security aspects of the different systems
and environments that give the IoT networks such a big range of cost-effective functionality.
There is a clear trade-off between the cost along with complexity of the device and the
security features. Usually, the choice of the manufacturers inclines more towards cost-
effectiveness and non-complex architecture. Hence, IoT technologies come with their
significant amount of vulnerabilities, through which, the security of the said networks can
be compromised in various ways that are not very difficult to carry out [2]. As a result,
there are various existing as well as potential or impending undesirable circumstances.
These circumstances include the user’s or some enterprise’s private or sensitive data being
compromised, exploitation or disruption of services along with whatever functionality it’s
providing [3], etc.
There are also a lot of critical systems where disruption can cause physical harm to human
beings. That is precisely why a lot of attention needs to go to security research for both
existing and upcoming IoT devices and platforms. Earlier predictions said that by 2020,
more than 25 percent of the identified attacks on enterprises will somehow involve IoT but
only 10 percent of the IT security budget will go behind it [4], which shows a clear disparity.
However different exploits and heavy handed attacks on big corporations and enterprises
has changed how the treat is looked at. In the current scenario, both organisations and
individuals are becoming aware of how important security and privacy [5, 6, 7, 8] are
and how not enough attention has been paid to it over the years. However, the number of
existing issues and the constant changes in the field make it more and more complex to
come up with solutions that fit into the broad picture.
As we prepare for 5G, Machine Type Communication (MTC) is one of the key pieces of
the puzzle that sets up the picture of the future [9]. MTC is further divided into Massive
MTC (mMTC) and Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency MTC (uMTC or URLLC). mMTC will
deal with tens of billions of connected machine type terminals that are a subset of massive
IoT, while the latter is about uninterrupted availability, low latency and high reliability.
While information security is required for both of these, security of uMTC extremely
important when one thinks of mission critical systems or systems that can cause harm to
users (e.g., self-driving cars) [10].
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The idea of this research is to create an IoT testbed that can accommodate different kinds
of security testing. The tests will shed light on how the vulnerabilities of the network
can be exploited when it comes to a generic IoT network that is connected to the cloud
and has multiple wireless technologies working on it. Once the attacks are carried out
using different attack vectors, potential mitigation or security reinforcement methods will
be discussed and evaluated. The testbed’s scalability and ability to be a close simulation
of a commercial or industrial IoT network will provide a more accurate idea of how the
real-world implementations work. Hence the testbed has to have a certain amount of
versatility. Ideally the test environment will keep on evolving so that it stays relevant with
the security scenario with modern IoT technologies as we go into the future.
1.1 Motivation
The advancement and evolution if IoT introduces a wide variety of new security threats and
challenges to the IoT devices, the operating systems, the platforms and the communication
itself. There is a lot to be compromised. Advanced and sophisticated security policies will
soon be required to protect those systems and devices from the different kinds of attacks
including having unauthorised physical access to the components of the networks. The
challenges are ever growing and proper encryption is more important than ever.
Interestingly, predictions also state that about thirty percent of IT leaders think that
security is a top barrier when it comes IoT as a leading technology [4]. Managing
secure communication when it comes to IoT, especially with the huge potential that looms
over it in the context of 5G implementation, will be a very important and significant
technological discourse for many years to come [11]. Furthermore IoT devices and their
use keep growing rapidly without a lot of comprehensive and fool-proof security measures
in place, hence the scope of this research becomes very relevant and important. Not only
is there a threat to the sensitive data of the user and enterprises but also, in some cases,
the consumer/workers’ safety. Hence it is crucial to have a practical analysis of these
exploitable areas in a test network, and eventually to look into probable counter-measures.
For that purpose, there needs to be a testing environment for IoT networks with diverse set
of functionalities that allow the network to be examined in context of different attacks and
subsequent defensive techniques.
The threat paradigm of IoT is manifold and it can be a complex field since there are
multiple surfaces or directions where the malicious activities can come from [12]. There
have been some detailed threat analyses about the existing and foreseeable challenges.
Even though it is a matter of constantly evolving with the needs and requirements for
the current state of the art, creating a platform where said attacks can be replicated or
simulated will provide a better general picture of the threats. While attack mitigation
techniques and analyses tend to focus more on the cloud/server [13, 14, 15, 16, 17] part
of the IoT environment, there needs to be equal amount of focus when it comes to the
air-interface technologies as well. The radio links can often be exploited and detailed
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threat analyses and understanding is also pertinent for the radio interfaces in order to come
up with well-rounded security solutions. The goals for this particular research stem from
the aforementioned backdrop. As we stand within the horizon of 5G as well as the new
industrial revolution, also being called Industry 4.0 with the heavy use of Cyber Physical
Systems, we are constantly dealing with novel security needs and to deliver solutions in
that context is something that needs to be addressed immediately [18].
1.2 Research Goals
The ideal scope of the thesis would be to make a scalable IoT testbed with support for
multiple wireless protocols. Furthermore, to have added features such as integration of
the industrial aspect of IoT, for example, a robotic arm or a similar appliance connected
to it. Primarily, it should accommodate all aspects of commercial implementation of IoT,
like Smart Health, Industrial IoT, Home Automation, etc. The edge network consisting
of the sensors or devices will connect to a multi-protocol gateway that will be connected
to a cloud computing platform which will further implement visualisation and control
functionalities. Different messaging protocols are also implemented, that are commonly
used for IoT application. After carrying out the aforementioned generic setup of the IoT
network, we tweak it further and put different security features on top of it. Finally we try
to find ways of attacking the network and evaluate the features that we have used for our
purposes. That way, a comprehensive evaluation of the testbed will be done. The idea is to
have multiple attack surfaces and vectors that are exploitable.
After setting up the network, the interfaces are further explored with existing and/or novel
attacks and exploration of possible mitigation techniques are done. While setting up the
network, we focus on a low-cost, Do-It-Yourself (DIY) approach. We use cost-effective
sensors and Raspberry Pis and Arduinos and mostly open source applications and libraries.
The network is structured in a way that we can create as many types of radio links as
possible to focus on the air interface security as well as the wired and cloud part. The
goal is to focus more on the air interface part and attempt to come up with novel security
solutions. Along with the practical implementation and writing the thesis.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The thesis is laid out in five essential parts. This chapter is an overview of the problem
area and the research goal that is to be achieved while we discuss broadly why the work is
important. In the next chapter, we describe the theoretical background and all the relevant
information that one would need to go over in order to better understand the scope of
the work done. We take a look at the different components of the network, the kind of
hardware and software that are being used along with all the different technologies that
we implement. It includes different software frameworks, radio and data protocols, etc.
Similarly the components that facilitate the different kinds of attacks and mitigations are
also covered in this chapter. The third chapter will go directly into the implementation
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of the proposed work. In this chapter, we go through the setup of the testbed and how
each component is working with each other to give us a fully scalable IoT network that
is connected to the cloud. We also go over how the data is being transferred and what
technologies are being used for it, as well as what kind of security considerations we have
taken for the implementation of the testbed. We then go through each building block to
have a better idea of the hardware and software deployment. In the fourth chapter, we
discuss the attacks that we have performed in detail, attempts to come up with counter-
measures are also done. Security evaluation is done for the different components of the
network, in case there is a potential for them to be exploited. We justify comparatively
how much the final practical work is in line with the vision that the work is based on. In
the fifth and final chapter, we analyse the whole research scope and try to discuss the key
learnings and other factors. We also propose how the scope can be expanded on and what
things can be done in the future along the line of this research.
52. BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we go over all the relevant theoretical information as well as all the
components, both hardware and software that we are using. The overview will lay the
foundation of what our work is based on.
2.1 Environments, Systems and Protocols
In this section, we go over the different environments that are relevant to the scope of the
work and shed light on the different hardware and software protocols and systems that we
would be using.
2.1.1 Internet of Things
Before a detailed analysis of the security aspect of IoT, it is important to have a brief
description of what it really is. IoT or Internet of Things is not just one technology, but
it is a combination of multiple technologies working with each other simultaneously. It
is a network of physical objects and things that communicate or talk to each other, they
are embedded electrically, and sometimes they have their own computational power to
process data. The interaction with the physical environment is made possible by the
sensors and actuators and the data they provide is collected and stored and eventually
processed for useful inference [19]. Any device, including a cellular phone or a refrigerator
can be thought of as a sensor as long as it is providing some insight into the state of
the environment that it is in. The actuator is a device that can trigger change in the said
environment, for example a thermostat, an electric heater, etc.
The term ’IoT’ was coined by Kevin Ashton [20] while presenting to Procter and Gamble
in 1999. A part of his presentation stated his idea that computers or embedded electronic
devices should be able to gather information by interacting or sensing their internal states
or the environment around them. Through the years since that presentation, after many
different definitions or interpretations, many branches and various implementation ideas,
IoT has truly become a huge part of our daily lives today and the trend is only growing. All
the different forecasts and predictions about the future show that the ’things’ are and will
be changing our lives when it comes to how we use technology. It is being used extensively
in diverse fields including health [21], farming, retail, transportation, and in our homes. It
is going to have an even bigger role to play with the impending arrival of 5G [22].
In 2018, there was a projected annual funding of 3.3 billion dollars [23]. Record numbers
of IoT start-ups are emerging or being acquired by bigger companies. That goes to show
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the industry demand and interest of consumers. That is mostly because there is such
widespread scope of applications and use-cases. Fig. 2.1 shows the fields where IoT
is being deployed successfully. However, not just the monetary aspect, but the heavy
integration in our day-to-day lives is also quite unprecedented. From baby monitors to
household security systems, from the garden watering system to critical things like health
monitoring, IoT is heavily deployed in the current day.
The benefits that IoT brings do not necessarily outweigh the attached risks with it. We
have mentioned multiple times the difficulty to integrate with different environments and
the challenges of installing and maintaining IoT devices regardless of its heavy use even in
mission-critical applications. Mission-critical systems are systems which, if facing any sort
of interruption or failure, can directly affect the survival of a business or an organisation.
The mission-critical systems built on IoT is gaining more and more traction in the field
of healthcare [24], industrial, power systems industries, etc. These systems are expected
to work at all times, without failures and sophisticated fail safe methods in place, and
covering everything including our wearables, smart cities, smart grids, etc. Simple example
where a mission-critical IoT system which can directly have effect on the safety of the user
is Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications in the context of the self-driven car industry,
where extremely low latency, high reliability, and high accuracy is required for road safety.
In the 5G context, multiple open standards in the IoT paradigm have been released, for
example, Cellular IoT by Vodafone and the NB-IoT based on 3GPP. Massive IoT will
be the key player in 5G where it should be able to accommodate up to billions of smart
things that are connected to the cloud. All of it will be based on Wireless Software Defined
Network(WSDN). There have already been proposals about multiple WSDN services such
as CloudRAN, SoftAir, CONTENT, etc [25].
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Figure 2.1. Overview of the use cases of IoT
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Architecture
The data that is collected with the IoT devices can be stored and processed on the edge of
the network or a remote server. The processing of the data is done at either the sensor itself
or some other device that is nearby. The processing and storage is subject to the device
itself since often the peripheral devices come with limited resources like computational and
processing power or storage. Like many things in IoT, the architecture is also something
that does not have a universal consensus [19]. During the literature review part of this
thesis, many proposed architectures were explored. The most common ones are three layer
and the five layer architectures [26]. The three layer architecture is from earlier research
work which, in order to focus on finer aspects of the technology has been tweaked to a
newer five layer architecture. Both the architectures are compared in the Fig. 2.2.
Figure 2.2. The IoT architecture
The earlier and more conventional architecture had mainly three layers. They were namely
perception layer, network layer and application layer [27]. The perception layer works
as the bottom layer and is handling the extraction of information from the connected
devices and converting all the data to digital data. The next layer or the network layer
is transporting the digital data through the network and lastly, the application layer is
responsible for putting the data or the signals into proper context and use [19]. On the
right side of Fig. 2.2, we can see the more detailed architecture where the application layer
has been divided into three parts, the service management layer, the application layer and
the business layer. The application layer has been renamed the object abstraction layer.
The layer at the bottom is called the object layer [28]. The object layer collects all the
data from the heterogeneous devices and processes and then converts the data to digital
format. Then the object abstraction layer uses communication technologies such as RFID,
LTE and Wi-Fi to mediate the data to the service management layer. All the information
processing and decision making for the network is done in the service management layer.
The application layer provides the high-end smart services to the consumer. The business
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layer, being at the top, constitutes of a business model and graphical representations derived
from the data received from the application layer [29].
One of the most popular of these fields in the recent years has been the field of smart
homes. Home automation solutions like connected lightbulbs, speakers, security systems
and appliances saw a huge amount of investment. Even though it is still quite popular, a
lot of investments lately have been exploring the other areas that focus more on industrial
solutions [18]. In fields like manufacturing, environment monitoring, agriculture, IoT is
being heavily deployed. Cities all over the world are looking towards becoming ’smart’.
Health monitoring, medicine delivery and even surgeries are coming within the scope of it
[30]. There are multiple network protocols that are used when it comes to IoT networks.
For example, RFID, Bluetooth, BLE, WiFi, Z-Wave, 6LoWPAN, LoRaWAN, DigiMesh,
NFC, ZigBee, etc. Figure 2.3 gives an overview about the communication protocol stack
for IoT.
Figure 2.3. IoT communication protocol stack
IoT Middleware
IoT middleware is what connects different, complex programs that exist already and
were not originally designed to be connected. The deployment of versatile middleware
warranties the desired flexibility and scalability that we hope to achieve with IoT deploy-
ment [31]. The main idea of Internet of Things is to connect different kinds of devices to
the internet and that is where the IoT middleware comes in. It is an important part of the
architecture that enables the connectivity aspect of large numbers of very diverse devices
or things. It does that by providing an extra layer for connectivity for the actuators, sensors
and other devices. It also provides the required application layers that provide services that
enable proper support for the relevant software.
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2.1.2 IoT Security Trends
In this section, we are going to talk about the security aspects of IoT, the common or known
threats and what has been done to deal with them so far. Since the goal of the research is
to contribute to and strengthen IoT security, this is an elaborate problem statement of the
whole thesis.
Identification and Addressing:
Identifying and locating a node or a device is one of the basic building blocks of IoT.
Without a proper identification method that not only identifies the object but also reflects the
properties of it, it is very difficult for an IoT network to function in a flexible manner [32].
Just as important as the identification process, is the location of the said object. When
it comes to location, the most popular method to locate objects is based on IPv4/IPv6.
In spite of the popularity of IP addressing, Named Data Networking (NDN) [33] is also
another potential solution since it is more data-oriented compared to IP. One of the main
hurdles of object identification is to make sure that the integrity of the records used in the
naming method is upheld. Popular name translation services like Domain Name Service
or DNS is not a fully secure naming system. It has multiple vulnerabilities such as cache
poisoning attack or man-in-the-middle attack [34]. The DNS cache poisoning is done
by injecting counterfeit DNS records into the cache of the target and compromising the
resolution mapping between the naming architecture and the addressing architecture. The
Domain Name Service Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is a contender for potential use to
make DNS more secure [35].
Low Computation Power:
When it comes to IoT, the devices are focused on having a lot of power efficiency and
being easily deployable remotely without a lot of maintenance. Even with devices like
wearables or other smart devices, the constrained resources have been an important factor.
Since the devices don’t have so much of computational power, many of the sophisticated
crypto-systems [36, 37, 38, 39] and security protocols [40, 41] are not suitable for IoT
particularly. One of the preferable crypto-systems is the asymmetric public key system [42].
However, the computational overhead for that is too high for a conventional inexpensive
IoT device. To come up with proper methods to secure the devices, without making
them more resource-equipped when it comes to computational power, is a long-standing
challenge for the Internet of Things and will remain so in the years to come.
Authentication:
Authentication and authorization are also key points when it comes to IoT security. The
conventional methods of doing proper authentication involves pre-shared keys, or public
keys, or the more traditional ID/password system. The heterogeneous nature of IoT devices
make it very difficult to use a traditional method. The number of devices are growing so
rapidly that key-management is becoming more and more difficult. Since there is no global
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root certificate, the use of public key crypto-system also becomes difficult and infeasible.
One of the methods that are widely used is delegated authentication where certain devices
in the network are responsible for the process of authentication of the other devices in the
network [32].
Data Privacy:
In the current day and age, data is one of the most powerful tools when it comes to
technology. A lot of our usage data over the internet is used for a better user experience and
more specifically catered content. That data is not only limited to our browsing data but
also the other applications we use with our wearables, home-assistants and smart devices.
Simply put, a lot of that data can be considered as important and personal information that
a user wouldn’t want to be compromised or to be vulnerable to any unauthorized use. That
is where it gets tricky, with the very flimsy security measures of IoT, all of the personal and
sensitive data becomes vulnerable in many ways [43]. Thanks to various data collection
legislations, there are many restrictions about what amount and what kind of data can be
collected and stored. However, in order to secure the data, it can also be anonymized. But
that also becomes challenging, because of the amount of diverse devices or ’things’ that
make it very difficult to have some sort of sophisticated crypto-system for the encryption
of the said data. Not all the data is concealed properly and the relation between the data
and its source or owner is not fully removed because that sort of information usually needs
to be shared in an IoT environment. One of the ways to deal with this is homomorphic
encryption [44]. However multiple Attribute-Based Encryptions have also been extensively
researched [42].
Software vulnerabilities:
When the software we use have some backdoors or have vulnerabilities that were somehow
not addressed during the development of the software or not known of, it can become a
very serious security issue. The attacks using these vulnerabilities are also called 0-Day
or Zero Day attacks [45]. Most of the vendors, when it comes to IoT devices and their
diverse hardware, struggle with this since it becomes very difficult to attain desirable
cost-effectiveness with software without compromising security. Moreover, many device
vendors find it very difficult to have frequent security updates. This is well known to the
attackers who are actively looking for these loopholes in the software. Rather rigorous and
dynamic testing is needed for this reason to have constant attention to this aspect when a
software is being rolled out and eventually updated. Deploying such analysis techniques
sometimes require ad-hoc development in the vastly diverse field of IoT [46].
Sometimes the backdoors are put in by the developers themselves for testing purposes,
however, these backdoors can soon be discovered by the attackers and then they can inject
commands or take full control of the said device. As we go into the future, and as data
privacy keeps on becoming one of the biggest concerns of modern day internet, it will be
interesting to see how different IoT environments will ensure that the private or sensitive
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data of the user has absolute protection.
IoT Malware:
In November 2013, Symantec confirmed that they had found what was to be considered
the first IoT malware, Linux.Darlloz [32]. Often, the bigger DDoS attacks [47, 48] are a
mere distraction and one smaller aspect of a much bigger attack. There have been many
similar attacks before, and after but of different magnitudes. Even though this was not the
first big IoT botnet attack, but it made its mark globally and once and for all established
how dangerous IoT malware can be.
The biggest botnet attack ever to have taken place was thanks to a huge number of
compromised IoT devices. A rather tempting target for attackers is the various range of
resource-constrained Internet of things (IoT) devices that do not come with very high-level
security. These devices can be anything ranging from home routers to web cameras. They
are often running on an embedded, stripped down Linux environment. They also lack the
built-in ability to be patched remotely. Hence three students, trying to launch a botnet
attack on a rival Minecraft server unleashed something that far exceeded their expectations
[49]. The source code was made available online. The Mirai malware, at its peak, infected
almost 600,000 devices. It was largely effective, even though a non-sophisticated malware
since it simply tried to access the telnet ports of the IoT devices across the internet trying to
login to them with a combination of default usernames and passwords. One such instance
was in 2016 when the compromised devices generated about 1.2 terabits of malicious
traffic on Dyn, an internet performance management company which also happens to be
one of the biggest DNS providers in the world [50]. The attack didn’t just depend on the
TCP and UDP traffic floods but also compound recursive DNS retry traffic, making it much
more impactful.
There are many steps that can be taken to be prepared for such attacks. For example,
different honeypots can be deployed to monitor or analyse malware behaviour over the
internet [51]. Honeypots are systems that are not real but they mimic real systems and log
the attacks from the internet. Proper sandboxing can also be done through them, which
means the malicious scripts can be run in a safe, limited environments to have a better
understanding of their behaviour. User awareness is also important since not many users
deem it necessary to properly secure their devices, changing the default passwords and
whatnot.
2.1.3 Cyber Physical Systems
There is no universal or authoritative definition of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), however
they are considered to be integrations of computation, networking, and physical processes
[52]. Simply put, Cyber Physical Systems are used to monitor and control the physical
world. The terminology itself presents an indispensable connection between the cyber
world and the physical world. It works as a feedback loop most of the time and usually
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a human as a central component [53]. Speaking of CPS, it does sound very similar to
the basic concept of Internet of Things. CPS are heavily deployed in the fields of energy,
transportation, manufacturing, healthcare, etc.
Relation Between CPS and IoT
While the fourth industrial revolution, often called Industry 4.0 is impending, Cyber Physi-
cal Systems and Internet of Things are both used as important terminology to emphasize
that these technologies are going to be key players in the coming time. In Figure 2.4,
we have tried to show how IoT and CPS stand harmoniously, complementing each other.
While any sensor, actuator, physical object connected to the internet is facilitating Internet
Of Things, a part of the network satisfies the criteria to be called Cyber Physical Systems.
Figure 2.4. Cyber physical systems and internet of things
2.1.4 Digital Twins
A digital twin is the virtual equivalent or digital representation of a process, service or a
device [54]. The emerging concept has the potential to be a very important factor as far as
5G or massive Machine Type Communication is concerned. The relational pairing of the
physical objects and their virtual counterparts allow analytics and monitoring of CPS like
never before. The potential of prevention of down time, security vulnerabilities and using
the massive amount of data for different kinds of prediction models can be very useful.
The digital representations provide insight into how IoT devices operate and live through
their different phases of life cycle. If all the "things" have a twin of their own, the relation
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between the virtual counterparts also could play a huge role as it would create a parallel
plane of connected things on a virtual level, which would provide unprecedented testing
and predictive capabilities. Industrial Internet of Things, that is being heavily deployed in
manufacturing and all different kinds of automation may get direct benefits from it [55].
2.1.5 SHODAN and IoT Device Search
SHODAN (Sentient Hyper-Optimised Data Access Network) is a search engine that
searches for and identifies all internet facing devices [56]. Its main purpose was to give
companies a look into how much of their software was being used. All devices connected
to the internet, especially devices that have routable IP addresses, like computers, web
cameras, printers, industrial IoT devices, etc., along with their port and service banner data
are viewable. It was launched in 2009 by John Matherly [57]. This tool is still heavily
used for multiple purposes, including penetration testing, evaluating vulnerabilities as well
as malicious activities.
At the very beginning, it used to have functionalities of interrogating basic service ports like
port 22 for Secure Shell (SSH), port 23 for Telnet, port 80 for HTTP etc. But since then, it
has expanded to have compatibilities for more than 40 services. All of this data is available
through a graphical user interface in a limited scale, for users without a subscription. From
the graphical interface, it is easy to navigate to different kinds of categories on the basis
of banners or services etc. Upon evaluating the results, the attacker can target a set of IP
addresses that would come under the IoT realm, hence having not so strong authentication
credentials. Because of the lack of awareness or sometimes, the incompetence of system
administrators, the number of systems that use default usernames and passwords is high.
Most common ones being admin and admin, respectively. It is also possible to brute-force
[58] these systems with other common non-complex passwords or passphrases or all
possible combinations of characters by running some simple script. Upon gaining access,
of course there are multiple types of attack that can be carried out.
However, as mentioned before, SHODAN does shed light on different aspects of the
internet connected devices. For example, one can look up the Mirai tag to have an overview
of the devices that have been infected by the Mirai botnet. It is widely used by security
professionals to do vulnerability assessments. This is also where the Honeypot project
comes in. To have an understanding of what kind of threats that loom over the devices that
are connected to internet, there are systems intentionally made to lure in attackers.
2.1.6 Honeypots
When it comes to security, awareness plays a key role in prevention or any relevant action
towards security solutions. This is why honeypots are so effective. Honeypots are systems
that attract attackers and records the interactions that the attackers have with the system.
There are different types of honeypots depending on the functionality and the amount of
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interaction that it allows. They categories can be divided between server/client honeypots,
virtual/physical honeypots and depending on the interaction and risk level, High Interaction
honeypots(HIHP), Medium Interaction Honeypots (MIHP) and Low Interaction Honeypots
(LIHP) [59]. They can also be categorized depending on the type of deployment and
the service on which the attacks are taking place, for example, web honeypots, database
honeypots, telnet honeypots etc. The more versatile commands and system behaviours
it accommodates, the closer it is to emulating a real system. Added functionalities like
running malicious scripts from attackers in a sandboxed environment are features of highly
interactive honeypots. They don’t actively prevent or counter the attacks but they provide
an insight to what kind of attacks the system is dealing with.
Low Interaction Honeypots:
For Low Interaction Honeypots, there are only a handful of services that are replicated,
however in a limited scope. The attackers cannot access the operating system or have no
shell access, however their authentication attempts or commands are logged. These are
used more for broad statistics and trends of attacks. These pose the lowest amount of risk
of system compromise, however, they are still subject to legal issues depending on what
kind of honeypot it is as they can be used for IP spoofing and amplification attacks. To put
it into context, honeypots do not only interact with attackers but also with the vulnerable
systems, if compromised, there is a risk that they would propagate the attack even further
[60].
Medium Interaction Honeypots:
Medium Interaction Honeypots are more interactive than the Low Interaction Honeypots.
The deployment and implementation is much less complex than that of High Interaction
Honeypots. However it collects more data than its lower interaction counterparts and has
more risks involved. The development process is slightly more complex than the previous
ones. These do not provide any operating system functionality, however they accommodate
more services and produce enough convincing responses to trigger follow-up attacks.
High Interaction Honeypots:
These are the most complex honeypots that replicate a real system without any restrictions
and have all the functionalities a real operating system would ideally have. The imple-
mentation, deployment and the maintaining of these honeypots are very complex and they
require a fair bit of expertise. The risk involved is also high because the system has more
of a chance of being compromised since so many resources and services are exposed to
the attacker. They also support code execution, as any proper operating system would,
hence there are legal and liability issues attached to it because whenever there is the risk
of a system being compromised, there is a risk of that system being used against other
vulnerable systems across the internet. The requirement of maintenance for these types of
honeypots are much higher than both medium and low interaction honeypots [61].
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2.1.7 IEEE 802.15.4 Overview
The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol is very significant when it comes to the IoT paradigm. Its
low data rate and low power requirements made it a perfect contender for the initial IoT
deployments. It is low-cost and it also provides an amount of flexibility that is preferred
for such networks. There are three main topologies that are used for this protocol [62], the
star topology, the peer-to-peer topology and the cluster-free topology. It mainly focuses
on specifications of the physical layer and media access control. Subsequently there were
more complex communication protocols that were build on top of this protocol, like the
ZigBee, 6LoWPan, etc. as seen in Fig. 2.3 that are widely used in the "things" world.
Hence in order to discuss the security of the protocols used for the scope of this research,
we have to start with what the security features of this particular protocol are and how they
work.
IEEE 802.15.4 Structure and Security
All the IEEE 802.15.4 compliant wireless protocols are based on the bottom layers of
the 802.15.4 protocol, which are Physical Layer (PHY) and the Data Link Layer. The
latter is divided into Medium Access Control layer (MAC) and the Logical Link Control
(LLC) layer [63]. The 802.15.4 MAC is used as a Data Link Layer for various wireless
networking protocols that are being deployed in a different fields. The 2006 and 2011
releases specify the protocol’s own MAC layer security.
802.15.4 MAC security uses the AES-CCM* Block Cypher Mode. For this purpose, the
AES-128 encryption method is used for authentication and encoding of data loads. The
MAC frame is shown in Fig. ??.
The AES-CCM* application is done in the following way. The Message Integrity Code
(MIC) is calculated for the whole frame consisting of the payload part and is added to
the very end of the frame. The payload and the MIC are then both encrypted. The
Physical Layer Cyclic Redundancy Check is computed over the encoded frame which is
then sent over-the-air. The received payload is decrypted and afterwards, the decrypted
MIC is matched with the original MIC to check if the payload has been authenticated and
decrypted successfully. In that case, the MIC is then removed and the data is sent to the
higher layers.
For the encryption and decryption purposes, 128-bit keys are used. In the following part of
the thesis, we have gone more into detail of the security aspect of the ZigBee specification
which functions on top of this layer.
2.1.8 ZigBee
ZigBee is a wireless communication standard based on the IEEE 802.15.4 for the PHY
and MAC layer, and other networking functionalities in the upper layers [64]. Its key
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features are similar to 802.15.4, for example low power, and low data-rate but at the same
time, it provides networking, routing, security and various different application profiles for
inter-operability [65].
A brief overview of the network components of a ZigBee network is provided in the
following part, as well as the security features and the associated risks. A basic example of
the network setup can be seen in Fig. 2.5.
Coordinator:
The whole management part of a ZigBee network is taken care of at the coordinator part
[66]. It establishes or constructs the network and also works as the TC or the Trust Center,
which means all the security features of the network are managed here. We shed more light
on how the trust center actually works later on when we talk about the security features of
ZigBee. Other devices cannot join the network unless the coordinator gives permission
and it also has all the network keys stored on it. The coordinator also takes care of the
distribution of the said keys. Since the coordinator is constantly managing the network,
it always has to be awake. Hence if the coordinator shuts down, the whole network goes
down with it.
Router:
The routers are connected to the coordinators and work as an intermediate component of the
network. They can permit other routers or end devices to join the network. A router itself
can work as an end device depending on what kind of topology that particular network is
using. Routers are also an essential part of the network and just like coordinators, shutting
down a router will kill the downlink part of the network.
End Device:
Devices like temperature-sensors or smart bulbs that have a more direct connection with
the consumer side are considered to be end devices. They are usually low power and have
very little computational power. They mostly just send the collected data to the coordinator
through a the routers. They have to communicate with the network through their parent
devices since they don’t have relay capabilities. Unlike coordinator or the router, the end
devices can use very little to no power, hence they can also be on sleep mode with the
network still functional. Some of them have battery life for years since the consumption is
so low. Sometimes, they are harvesting energy hence they have a power supply for life
time [67].
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Figure 2.5. ZigBee network
Network Topologies
There are three main topologies that are used within the ZigBee protocol. The topologies
are: Star, Tree and Mesh. They are talked about in the following part.
Star Topology:
Star topology usually sees the coordinator at the very end of the network and the other
end devices are connected directly to the coordinator. Which means that in this kind of
topology, there is practically no difference between the routers and the end devices because
it only has two layers in this sense of a hierarchy. The devices that are connected to the
coordinator and they cannot communicate with each other so all the packets go directly
through the coordinator, as seen in Fig. 2.6.
Figure 2.6. ZigBee topologies
Tree Topology:
In this kind of topology, the routers are parent nodes to the end devices and are connected
to other routers or the coordinator as a child node. Hence end devices do not communicate
with each other. All the communication must go through the parent node in this case.
However, if a parent node is not working properly, that whole section of the network stops
working since the child nodes cannot talk to each other directly as seen in Fig. 2.6.
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Mesh Topology:
Mesh is the most complex and advanced among these topologies. Mostly because all the
nodes can communicate with each other. Usually it has one coordinator, one or more
routers and there could basically be any number of end devices. This is the best option
when focussing on scalability because any node can leave or join the network at any
point but as stated before, it is advanced level of networking and for bigger networks, the
overhead becomes so big that it can cause problems with the setup [67]. There has been
more discussion about the preference of a specific topology in the later parts of the thesis
when we get more into the implementation part and the specifications of the test network
as seen in Fig. 2.6.
2.1.9 ZigBee Security
ZigBee networks usually have two levels of security, High Security (or Commercial Secu-
rity) and Standard Security (or Residential Security). Key management and distribution
are the major differences between these two levels of security.
The key element, when it comes to ZigBee security is the Trust Center (TC). It is responsi-
ble for the whole security management of the network. It could be any one device in the
ZigBee network. It mainly uses three kinds of keys to provide the security mechanisms,
which are network key, master key, and link key [68]. This part of the network is also
responsible for key management and selecting which level of security to enforce. All the
devices in the ZigBee network share the network key which is common, however, for two
devices to connect to each other securely, a link key is required. The master key helps
derive the link key. In Fig. 2.7, a rough overview of the ZigBee protocol stack has been
depicted.
Figure 2.7. The ZigBee stack protocol
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Authentication and Encryption in a ZigBee network:
The encryption method that is used to encrypt the data is the AES-128 or the 128 bit
Advanced Encryption Standard in combination with CCM (Counter with Cipher Block
Chaining Message Authentication Code) mode. It is compliant with Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS). ZigBee uses CCM* instead of CCM as for CCM, both
authentication and encryption are required but for CCM*, more flexibility is achieved since
either one of authentication or encryption can be used [69].
Data Integrity:
The authenticity, integrity and the freshness of the data is of utmost importance. In order
to make sure that the received data has not been altered since its transmission, the Message
Integrity Code or the MIC is used. (see Fig. 2.6). The ZigBee protocol supports 16-,
32-, 64-, and 128-bit MIC lengths [69]. The MIC generation is done by using the CCM*
protocol.
Freshness of the data is verified by the nonce of the message, which is a 13-octet string
constructed using a combination of security control, frame counter and the source address
field.
Figure 2.8. Using MIC to provide data integrity[68]
Key Management:
In order to provide proper security in a network, key management has to be given a lot of
importance. Conventionally the security keys can be distributed among the devices in the
ZigBee network either over-the-air or they can be pre-installed onto each and every device.
It depends on the level of security that is being used by the network [70]. For High Security
level, the network key is always distributed over the air after having been encrypted with
the master key. That makes it rather secure. However, for Standard Security level, the
network key is distributed without any proper encryption [69]. This is problematic because
then the key can be extracted through eavesdropping or any sort of interception of the
traffic. However, it is possible to manually install the network keys onto the devices but
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usually the network administrators incline more towards usability than security because in
this case, it is a clear trade-off between the two.
2.1.10 Bluetooth Protocol
The Bluetooth protocol is a short-range RF wireless technology that enables more than one
device to communicate wirelessly. It has been a popular tool to transfer data wirelessly
for longer than a decade now. Modern Bluetooth systems mainly use three topologies.
The one-to-one formation is when a device connects to another device and there is an
end-to-end communication. When a device broadcasts to multiple other devices, it is the
one-to-many formation. When multiple devices in one network can communicate with
more than one device at the same time, it is the many-to-many setup. With Bluetooth 5.0,
there is full mesh support. The different topologies are shown in Fig. 2.9.
Figure 2.9. Bluetooth topologies
BLE Security
Bluetooth is heavily implemented on peripheral devices such as headphones, speakers,
fitness trackers, medical devices etc. These are run on battery and most of the time,
have some long term pairing with devices that they may lose connections to for a longer
period of time. They require periodic connections to the devices that they are paired with,
whenever there needs to be data transfer or synchronization. However, the pairing remains
in spite of longer sleep periods between wake modes [71].
In the modern Bluetooth systems, also called Bluetooth smart, there are four security levels.
The least secure being Security Level 1, which does not require any security enforcement
and supports non-secure, unencrypted communication, even unpaired. Security Level 2
supports an AES-CMAC encryption model which is also known as AES-128 via RFC 4493,
during data transfer when the devices are still not paired. Security Level 3 requires the same
sort of encryption but the devices need to be paired in order to communicate and transfer
information between each other. Security Level 4 uses Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman or
P-256 encryption instead of the AES-CMAC which is considered to be stronger. Hence
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the numbers 1 to 4 are appropriately set making 1 the least and number 4 the most secure
of the levels.
Apart from the different security levels, there are two main modes of security, they are LE
Security Mode 1 and LE Security Mode 2. The first one doesn’t have any requirement
for signing of the data and the latter requires the aforementioned security levels with data
signing, for both paired and unpaired devices. Additionally, there are two security modes
called Secure Connection Only Mode and Mixed Security Mode. Secure Connection Only
Mode is a combination of Security Level 4 and Security Mode 1. In this case, all of the
traffic requires authentication and encryption. The Secure Connection Only Mode can also
be run using Secure Mode 2 instead of Secure Mode 1 to make sure all data is signed, but
it compromises the power efficiency because of the extra woe of resources.
Keeping the security modes and levels in mind, analysing the pairing process of Bluetooth
devices is also important since it is during the pairing process where all the security-related
events take place. It determines what kind of capabilities are present at each side when the
devices are about to pair and then the actual communication part. The pairing takes three
phases to be carried out successfully.
First phase is when the devices let each other know what they are capable of doing by
reading each other’s Attribution Protocol (ATT) values which are usually unencrypted.
Then the pairing process that is going to be used at phase two is determined. In the next
phase, a Short Term Key (STK) is generated. This is done after the nodes have agreed on a
Temporary Key (TK) mixed with random numbers which provides the STK. Interestingly,
the STK is never exchanged between the actual devices. When only the STK is used, it
is called the LE Legacy Pairing. In case of Secure Connection Only Mode being used, a
Long Term Key (LTK) is generated, and the connection is considered to be LE Secure
Connection. In the third phase, the key generated in the previous phase is used to distribute
the remaining keys required for the nodes to communicate. If the LTK wasn’t created
in the previous phase, it is done in the current one. Other keys such as the Connection
Signature Resolving Key (CSRK) used for signing the data and the Identity Resolving Key
(IRK) used for private MAC address creation are created in this phase.
Pairing between two devices can be done in four different ways. They are described below.
Numeric Comparison:
Both nodes or devices use their respective displays to show the same 6 digit numbers, for
the user to determine that the pairing is secure if the numbers are matching. The method
was added in BLE 4.0 onwards and it does not prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
Just Works:
Devices that come without a display such as speakers, headphones etc. use this method.
This widely used method works similarly to Numeric Comparison but instead of six
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different numbers, it sets all those 6 values to zeroes. The keys are automatically exchanged
without the requirement of any user input and hence it is the pairing method where MITM
attacks or eavesdropping can easily take place.
Out Of Band:
A different communication channel is used instead of the Bluetooth communication
channel to carry out the key exchange, and the security of the communication depends on
the alternative means of communication that was used.
Passkey Entry:
One of the devices displays a six digit key. The same six digit key is entered manually on
the other device for the connection to be established. BLE 4.2 onwards, ECDH is also
available which brings eavesdropping protection [72].
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we shed light on research work that has been carried out that are along
similar lines of our work. We talk about some of the existing testbeds for the Internet of
Things and we talk about the features that we are aiming for, for our own testbed, in a
comparative manner.
2.2.1 Existing Testbeds
There are multiple existing testbeds for similar purposes [73] all around the world. Different
testbeds or labs focus on different aspects. Some of the existing ones are listed below. It is
important to remember that none of the mentioned testbeds focus solely on security. The
testbed what we are making is solely for the purpose of carrying out security tests and
evaluation.
FIT IoT-LAB:
It is an open testbed that is composed of 2728 low-power wireless nodes and 117 mobile
robots that are being used to experiment with large scale IoT implementation [74]. It
includes both low level protocols and advanced internet services for a more widespread
scope of emulation. It is deployed in 6 sites across France. Even though all the sites have
different node and hardware capabilities, all of them are connected and available through
the same web portal, common REST interfaces and consistent CLI tools. It creates a
platform for heterogeneous testing and is completely open source.
INDRIYA 2:
INDRIYA 2 is based on the original INDRIYA testbed [75]. It is a three-dimensional
wireless sensor network deployed across the National University of Singapore. This testbed
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is mainly for research in sensor network programming environments, communication
protocols and system design etc. It provides round the clock public access to the test
platform. Anyone can upload executables, create jobs over the motes and schedule them
to run at any given point. Then the monitoring and visualisation part is done through the
web portal. The 2nd iteration of Indriya is largely the same, deployment-wise. It addresses
some of the issues like having different kinds of motes, more scalability and to have only
one language base for development so that it is easier to maintain and upgrade [76].
MoteLab:
It is a web-based testbed that has a set of nodes that have been deployed permanently and
are connected to a central server which provides a web interface that logs data as well
as schedule events. It smoothens development and debugging by logging the data with
help of automation which subsequently makes sure that the performance of the sensor
network software is evaluated offline. Also, with the web interface, it allows both local
and remote users access to the testbed. The system that takes care of the scheduling quota
makes sure that there is a fair sharing mechanism going on. It has been deployed at the
Harvard University and is completely open source [77].
The TKN WIreless NetworkS Testbed:
The TKN WIreless NetworkS Testbed (TWIST) has been designed and developed by
the Telecommunication Networks Group (TKN) at the Technische Universität, Berlin.
It is another open-source indoor WSN testbed that is scalable and facilitates testing
with different node configurations, programming throughout the network and different
debugging methods. It also provides a heterogeneous node setup support and it has
self-configuration capabilities that use the hardware with standardized interfaces [78].
FlockLab:
FlockLab is a testbed developed and maintained by the Computer Engineering and Net-
works Laboratory at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich in Switzerland. This
is a testbed allows multiple services to run simultaneously and synchronously across all
nodes. There is an extra feature for this testbed as all the nodes come with GPIO pins to
record all logical events. It uses GPIO tracing as a tool for debugging timing sensitive
code [79]. It supports multiple target platforms, which in turn allows comparative analysis
of applications and protocols when it comes to the same physical topology. Users have
the option to apply power profiling and GPIO tracing against all targets to correlate power
samples and logical events and they could also adjust the target supply voltage dynamically
to closely emulate battery depletion situations.
SensLab:
It is a very large scale open WSN testbed that has been developed and deployed to allow
scalable experimentation in the realm of WSN. The testbed consists of 1024 nodes and
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is spread across 4 sites. every location has an even proportion of 256 sensor nodes with
specific characteristics in order to offer a wide range of functionality and applications. Two
of the sites also offer access to mobile nodes and within any given site, all the 256 nodes
are able to communicate with each other with help of the radio interfaces. Each node can
also work as a sink node and hence can communicate with other sink nodes of the whole
network or any external device on the internet [80].
2.2.2 Some Existing Attacks on Zigbee Networks
The initial practical work within the scope of this thesis primarily starts with a ZigBee
sensor network. Hence it is essential to understand what are the common and known attacks
that take place against ZigBee networks. Only a few of the probable attacks are going to
be discussed here (excluding physical attacks to end devices, nonce attacks etc.), some of
these attacks are going to be tested against the test network and possible countermeasures
or improvements are going to be proposed.
ZigBee Network Sniffing:
When it comes to the Standard Security level, one of the various vulnerabilities the
ZigBee network has had is the transportation of the network key over-the-air without any
encryption, unless of course the network key is already pre-installed in the device. The TC
usually sends the network key to the nodes that want to join the network. If an attacker has
means to capture and convert the data that is being transported, the network can be easily
attacked and malicious traffic can be injected into the network [70]. There has been lots of
discussion and proposals about doing away with the Standard Security level, however the
trade-off between usability and security remains a problem, as mentioned before.
Network Discovery and Identification in ZigBee networks:
The network discovery for ZigBee networks is done with the help of beacon request frames.
So a ZigBee device will scan for other devices with the beacon signal and upon receiving
said signal, the Router or the Coordinator will share the PAN ID, the source address, stack
profile and version information, and various other IEEE address information with the
device [81]. The same process can be mimicked by an attacker to gain access to important
information about the network. In order to avoid PAN ID conflicts, this process is essential.
However, the kind of information the attacker gets by faking the discovery process, can be
used for multiple kinds of attacks on the network.
Replay attack:
A replay attack is when a valid data transfer is maliciously repeated or delayed after
successful interception of the said data. Usually in ZigBee networks, the devices have
a 32-bit frame counter to make sure that the frames aren’t repeating themselves and are
fresh. The counter increases every time a new frame has been received and is restored to
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zero when the network key is changed [82]. So in a way, frame counters are a counter-
measure for the replay attacks but it is not enough. If an attacker manages to inject a
frame with a high frame counter value, a device will not be able to receive new frames
unless a legitimate transmitting device has a higher frame counter value than the one of the
attacker. The magnitude and the importance of this attack can vary depending on what kind
of data is being transmitted. For example, for safety-critical applications like factories,
healthcare [83, 84], repetition of commands can be catastrophic. Moreover DoS attacks
can also be carried out subsequently with replay attacks.
Various solutions have been proposed including time-stamping the frames, which will
require all the devices to be clock synchronized and will require the coordinator to store
more time-stamping data. Cache et al. [81] proposed that Replay attacks can be dealt with
by simply configuring ZigBee stacks in a way so that it is able to confirm the sequence
number of the received frame so that it has to be at least greater by one than the sequence
number of packet that was received just before and was successfully processed.
Denial of Service Attack:
The End Devices in a ZigBee network mostly run on batteries. The ratio of the time that the
device is active doing radio communication to the time the device is sleeping is called the
Duty Cycle. Usually the End devices have very low duty cycle. The main reason behind
it is that the idea of most ZigBee networks is that the end devices should be consuming
low power and would need minimal maintenance. Many of these devices can go on for
years on end after installation without the requirement of change of batteries [69]. One of
the ways to successfully carry out a Denial Of Service attack on a ZigBee network is to
jam the Contention Access Period and the Contention Free Period which causes a device
to be on a constant retransmission loop, resulting in depletion and eventual exhaustion of
the battery life of the device. On some occasions, even encryption is not a secure enough
measure as the integrity of the message is also just as important. While End devices are
not transferring any data, they can go to deep sleep only waking up on certain intervals to
interact with the network. If the wake up interval is the same each time, then that can also
be exploited. Hence it is advisable to have irregular intervals for device wake up. Recent
advancements have seen the wake-on-radio feature being implemented by various chip
vendors which makes it more difficult for an attacker to exploit the easily derivable activity
period of a network.
Interception of Packets:
Zigbee networks are conventionally not very good with secure communication [85]. A
significant portion of functional Zigbee networks still don’t use proper encryption. And
since there is not a lot of strong encryption techniques that are being used, attackers
who can access the channel with the help of a radio module and software frameworks
like Killerbee (Zigbee security testing tool, based on Scapy), can also easily intercept
the traffic. The captured packets often contain sensitive data. Tools like Wireshark can
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be used and the captured data can be further analysed. All sorts of information that is
unencrypted can be extracted easily and once the attacker has access to the network, con-
stant eavesdropping can also be done. Hence personal and sensitive data about the users
can also be acquired. Whenever there is unencrypted data over-the-air, the chances of
interception and misuse is always there, especially in today’s scenario when data privacy
is such a huge topic of discussion all across the world. Hence it is only desirable that
all sorts of security standards have some sort of minimal encryption as a mandatory feature.
Remote AT or Attention Command:
There is one particular paper which states the possibility to send remote commands to the
devices connected to a Zigbee Network [86]. The AT command or the Attention command
is used to communicate with a connected sensor, in order to reconfigure the device. This
research also used XBee Radio modules to set up a sensor network and exploited the ATID
command which is used by the module to set the network identifier. A malicious user then
uses the ATID packet with fake identifiers in order to make it join different networks. It
can also forward sensitive data to unauthorized receivers or to deactivate any encryption
system that encrypts the data. This works mainly in the MAC layer and since it functions
in a lower layer, the packets that are received aren’t processed at the application layer. For
that reason, the sent packet is not evaluated or interpreted by the network, except from the
device manufacturer. Various devices across the market use AT commands. This sort of
attack can have consequences such as command injections into the radio device, Denial of
Service, and private data leak as a result.
2.3 Hardware and Software
In Fig. 2.10, the planned network setup is shown and in the following portion of the
thesis, each of the component will be described. There are different kinds of hardware and
software components working together to make the network functional and it is important
to examine and evaluate the reasons behind each component that has been used for the
setup.
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Figure 2.10. Detailed network setup
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2.3.1 Digi XBee
XBee from Digi International is a radio module that works with the ZigBee and other
802.15.4 protocols (namely base 802.15.4 and Digimensh). The specific model that we are
using is the XBee Series 2 C model. It is efficient for point-to-point, mesh or multi-point
networking. They come with 1 mW wire antennas that serve the purpose for our scope.
The design helps accommodate high through-put applications requiring low latency and
predictable communication timing. There are multiple firmware that can be flashed on the
device, depending on the exact wireless protocol that we want to use. These devices can
also be used with some of the devices that come under the Home Automation paradigm
which makes it scalable.
The reason to choose this particular device is the low cost and the programmability. Hence
it helps the sensor network setup, adding more flexibility. It operates within the ISM 2.4
GHz frequency band and uses the Silicon Labs EM357 chipset [87]. The pinout diagram
is shown in Fig. 2.11. These devices come with their own software suite called the XCTU
and there are inbuilt firmware features in place, like security, which we have discussed in
detail in the later parts.
Figure 2.11. XBee S2C Pro and schematic diagram [87]
XCTU
The XCTU is the software with which, the XBee modules can be programmed. Even
though they will be attached to different devices, the modules will have their own firmware
and configurations flashed with the help of this software, which will help with the formation
and the initial security setup of the network. The software also has a console where the
basic data transfer between multiple radio modules can be tested and visualised. Through
this programme, the main operation mode of the XBee can also be set. There are mainly
two modes, the AT mode and the API mode. The AT or Transparent mode is for direct
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serial communication between two devices and the API mode is a more complex way
of handling the packet formation that brings different, more advanced features into the
picture.
Difference between AT and API mode:
The AT mode or the Transparent mode is considered to be a simpler configuration where
the data is sent to the remote XBee module identified by the destination address that is
already stored in the memory of the XBee device. There are no packets configured for this
purpose and the Serial data is simply sent from Tx of one XBee to the RX of another. This
is a fast and easy way to test XBee hardware and the transmission/receiving. However, this
does not offer the advanced features that the API mode offers, like advanced networking
diagnostics, firmware upgrades or remote discovery of other nodes or XBee devices. This
lacks important information like the sender’s address, the transmission details and in some
cases the reasons for failure of communication. It also has to update the configuration
every time to establish a new destination in order to transmit data.
The API mode, however, follows a more complex packet formation technique and has
many advantages over the transparent mode. With this mode, multiple devices can receive
data at the same time and they can receive remote configuration or AT commands hence
their internal settings can be changed over the air. It can identify the source that are sending
the data packets as it supports multiple XBee devices to send data. It also supports extra
information like remote I/O samples, multiple endpoints/cluster profiles. it uses the ZigBee
Device Object or ZDO for the ZigBee devices, which is a stack-level entity defined by
the ZigBee Networking Specification which is mainly used for network management and
information gathering. For aforementioned advantages when it comes to functionality and
the advanced features, we have chosen to use the API mode for our purposes.
2.3.2 HC-05
This hardware module is a Bluetooth module that establishes data communication links over
the air in a short range between two systems such as micro-controllers or any compatible
device. The module can act as both a master or a slave device and is an economical
method of having a wireless link between two or more devices. It has fair amount of
flexibility compared to other options and it can transmit data and files at a speed that goes
up to 2.1 Megabytes per second. It uses Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS)
technology to make sure that it doesn’t have any interference with other systems and
devices. Its operational frequency range is from 2.402 to 2.480 GHz and it uses full duplex
transmission. We interface it with the Arduino to connect it to the inbuilt Bluetooth module
on the Raspberry Pi. More details are provided in the later sections of the thesis. The
modules come already attached to a breakout board (ZS-040). The pinout diagram is
shown in Fig. 2.12. The module is programmed using the Arduino UNO and using the
compatible AT commands from the documentation [88].
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Figure 2.12. HC-05 Bluetooth module pinout diagram
2.3.3 MTM-CM5000-MSP
This is a WSN mote that is compliant with the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. These act as
wireless sensor nodes based on the original open-source Tmote Sky/TelosB platform
developed by the University of California, Berkeley. There are three types onboard sensors
on this module, temperature, relative humidity and light. It has the Texas Instrument
MSP430 Processor along with the CC2420 RF transceiver chip. Widely used for research
purposes, these are compatible with both TinyOS and Contiki. TinyOS and Contiki are
lightweight operating systems for efficient wireless sensor network deployments. They are
programmable through USB and run on 2 AA batteries and are very power efficient [89].
Contiki vs TinyOS
There are some major differences between the two operating systems that the mote can
function on. Both platforms have their inbuilt programmable routing protocols and security
features.
TinyOS:
It is one of the earliest OS developed for such purposes [90]. It is a micro-threaded oper-
ating system that allows concurrent data flow across hardware and provides components
that are highly modularized, hence creating very little storage and processing overhead.
It follows an event-based model to help run different applications simultaneously using
very little memory. Whereas a stack-based approach would take more time to execute
compared to the event based approach it uses. It uses very efficient power management
and the processes are maintained in sleep mode when the device is idle. Fig. 2.13 depicts
the basic structure of the TinyOS functionality.
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Figure 2.13. TinyOS layer model
Within the operating system, there is a scheduler that schedules different operations of
the said components. Each component includes the following parts: command handlers,
event handlers, an encapsulated fixed-size frame and a cluster of tasks. The task scheduler
handles the current task with a simple FIFO mechanism which uses a very small scheduling
data structure. It also specifies the requirement for memory allocation of a component at
the time of compiling and removes any overhead that arises from dynamic assignment.
The commands are executed in little time. The event handler is invoked whenever a
hardware trigger occurs, subsequently tasks are assigned, and high-level events are issued
or low-level commands are called. Tasks are also a big part of the components. Tasks, just
as events, may call low-level commands and issue high-level events, and assign other tasks.
TinyOS is configured in the nesC language.
There are mainly three components in play here, which are hardware abstractions, synthetic
hardware, and high-level software components. The first one being at the lowest level
are usually responsible for mapping the physical hardware like I/O devices, sensors or
actuators and radio transceivers. All the components are mapped to some level of hardware
abstraction. The second type of components are used to map the behaviour of the higher
end hardware that are usually situated on the hardware abstraction components. TinyOS
also has hardware abstraction component which is called the Radio Frequency Module
that works as the radio transceiver and a synthetic hardware component which is called the
radio byte, which handles the data communication part of the Radio Frequency Module.
Contiki Operating System:
Contiki is another light-weight operating system that works in the same paradigm as
TinyOS. It is an open source platform for embedded systems connected to networks [91].
It was developed by developers and contributors from the industry as well as the academic
world, led by Adam Dunkels. Running Contiki requires all the elements for a functional OS
such as kernel, program loader, libraries and all the processes that are required. Processes
communicate only through the OS kernel hence there is no need for a hardware abstraction
layer. There is private memory allocated to each process which stores the state information
of the process itself. In Fig. 2.14, we have shown the basic structure of the operating
system where there are two main parts. First is the Core, and on top of that is the loaded
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program portion. The core includes the Kernel and the program loader part facilitates the
language runtime and the libraries that are supported along with a communication stack
with drivers required for the communication hardware that is being used. It is also the first
platform for WSN that introduced IP support with the uIP TCP/IP stack [92]. eventually, it
incorporated uIPv6, the smallest IPv6 stack in the world. This is significant because where
resources are limited, and the environment is constrained, the very miniscule footprint that
uIP has makes everything easier. Contiki is based on the C language.
Figure 2.14. Contiki operating system
The learning curve with Contiki is much steeper and TinyOS is easier to set up within our
network. Hence keeping the time constraints and the scope of the research work in mind,
we pick TinyOS as the suitable candidate for our implementation.
2.3.4 Software Defined Radio
A radio device is usually that can communicate with other devices wirelessly by transmit-
ting and receiving modulated electromagnetic waves. Traditionally a hardware radio device
consists of filters, mixers, amplifiers, detectors, modulators and demodulators etc. However
the advancement in the embedded systems and in the field of software has allowed radios
to be implemented without the traditional hardware. The software defined radio has gone
through a rapid evolution. The term ’digital receiver’ was first used in the 1970. Since then,
a lot of different names have been used. Most notably, in mid 1980s, one of the first major
software defined radio platforms called SpeakEasy was created by Hazeltine and Motorola.
It was used to communicate between different standards within 2 MHz and 2 GHz band by
the military. It provided proper interpolating capabilities between different air interfaces
within that frequency range. We have come a long way from there and today, when a
simple Field Programmable Gate Array or FPGA can be configured with a downloaded
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code within a few milliseconds to change the transmission protocols and frequencies of
the SDR.
Figure 2.15. Hardware and software architecture for an SDR
Ettus USRP B210
The Ettus USRP B210 is a Software Defined Radio. It covers RF frequencies from 70
MHz to 6 GHz. It is equipped with a Spartan6 FPGA board and USB 3.0 connectivity.
Hence it enables us to do experimentation within a wide range of communication protocols.
It has two receive and two transmit channels, each working in a bus-powered design. This
particular model also introduced an external power supply and larger FPGA and GPIO
compared to its predecessor (as seen in Fig. 2.16). It uses Analogue Device RFIC to make
sure a cost-effective RF research/experimentation platform is delivered. Streaming up to
56 MHz of instantaneous bandwidth over a high-bandwidth USB 3.0 bus on select USB
3.0 chipsets is possible. The USRP hardware driver makes it easier for users to develop
their own applications without difficulty since it is open-source and for cross-platform use.
it is accompanied with an enclosure box and a couple of antennas (as seen in Fig. 2.16).
For our purpose, we use LTE antennas, which do not have large distance ranges, however
the frequency range works fine within out scope. We will be using a software framework
called GNU Radio.
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Figure 2.16. USRP B210 with and without enclosure and antennas
2.3.5 Arduino
The Arduino UNO is a microcontroller board that has the ATmega328P on it. Consisting
of 14 digital input/output pins within which, 6 of them can be used as PWM outputs. There
are also 6 analogue in-outs, one 16 MHz quartz crystal, an ICSP header along with a
USB port, a power supply and a reset button. It is simple to just connect it to a computer
and start uploading the programmes that are to be used. It is the most robust among the
products by Arduino hence an easy choice for experimentation. We are going to use the
Arduino IDE which is the software platform, through which different firmware that are
called sketches can be flashed to the device [93]. There is a lot of support and numerous
public libraries and different forums where getting community support is also rather easy.
2.3.6 Raspberry Pi
The Raspberry Pi 3 B+ is a small sized single-board computer which can be used without
a monitor and other peripheral devices after the initial setup. It comes with a 64-bit quad
core processor running at 1.4 GHz, dual-band 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz WLAN connectivity
as well as Bluetooth 4.2/BLE and Ethernet. It has a Broadcom BCM2837b0, Cortex-A54
64-bit SoC processor with a 1.4 GHz clock speed. It also comes with 1GB LPDDR2 RAM,
40-pin GPIO header, an HDMI port, 4 USB ports and a Micro SD car slot. It is powered
through a micro USB connector. There will be a couple of Raspberry Pis used for this
research since one will be used as a gateway for the network itself while the other one will
be used with the Raspbee add-on board. It is explained elaborately in the section where
we talk about the network setup. The Raspberry Pi has its own compatible Debian Stretch
version downloadable from the website [94].
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2.3.7 Raspbee
The Raspbee is an add-on board for Raspberry Pi that works on the ZigBee protocol. It can
help the Raspberry Pi become a fully functional node within the ZigBee network. We are
going to use it to monitor and control the network. It will be a replacement for the Software
Defined Radio in case of indirect communication. The board consists of a powerful radio
module with integrated power amplifier and low noise amplifier. The on-board chip antenna
provides sufficient RF capabilities. It came with the ZigBee firmware already flashed to
it. However, for the scope of the thesis, a scapy-radio based firmware is going to be used
on it. The ZigBee radio module used on the board is deRFmega256-23M12 by Dresden
Elektronik [95].
2.3.8 GNU Radio
GNU Radio, as mentioned earlier is a free, open-source software development toolkit
that provides the blocks required for signal processing in order to implement radios on a
software level. It is compatible with many readily available inexpensive SDRs. However,
after installing UHD or USRP Hardware Drivers, GNU Radio has full compatibility with
the Ettus USRP B210. We are also going to use an extension of this module called the
GRC or the GNU Radio Companion, which is a graphical interface that makes the design
of the radio system much simpler and generates a python code afterwards.
2.3.9 Scapy
Scapy is a very useful and interactive packet manipulation software framework. It has the
ability to forge or decode packets of various numbers of protocols and then send them
on the wire, capture them, match requests and replies etc. It is able to handle tasks like
scanning, tracerouting, probing, unit tests, attacks or network discovery [96]. We are
not going to use Scapy directly, however we are going to use many programs that are
extensions or derivations of Scapy, for example Scapy Radio or Secbee.
2.3.10 MQTT
MQTT or Message Queueing Telemetry Transport is a lightweight messaging protocol.
It uses the publish and subscribe also known as the pub/sub system [97] where one can
publish or receive data as a client. This is mainly used for resource constrained devices
with low bandwidths. Hence it is widely used in IoT networks because it can efficiently
transport sensor data as well as have support for sending control messages to connected
things or devices. Depending on the number of clients and topics, multiple kinds of data
can be shared between numerous devices. We will be using this protocol to push the sensor
data from the gateway to cloud, for visualisation and analytics. There are multiple ways
of doing this using different protocols such as REST [98], however for the scope of the
thesis, we wanted to use MQTT since it is already heavily used for IoT applications. It
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works on TCP and it has a sister protocol called the MQTT-SN where the SN stands for
Sensor Networks, that works on UDP [99].
Figure 2.17. MQTT protocol
There are different types of brokers and clients that are used for this purpose. We are going
to use the open source Eclipse Mosquitto broker and the python paho-mqtt client for our
research.
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3. IMPLEMENTATION
In this chapter, we are going to talk in detail about the whole implementation of the
practical work for the thesis and the methodologies used. We first start with the network
setup of the IoT network. To be more specific, the network, as mentioned before is going
to be a simple wireless sensor network that senses and processes temperature and humidity
data from the environment.
3.1 Ideal Features of the Testbed
A testbed is a controlled environment where we perform different actions in a secure and
isolated way without exposing the processes that are being controlled, to any vulnerability.
The goal is to establish opportunities for different attacks and evaluate some of the typical
security measures and come up with potential mitigation techniques. There are some basic
functional requirements that we want to achieve with the testbed. These requirements
range from what kind of test it supports, the test definition and analysis of the tests and
their results. There are some additional requirements such as how flexible or scalable it is
and whether there are already apt security measures in place and whether the behaviour
is reliable. The first step however is to build a testbed that very realistically emulates the
real-world scenario. All basic components of a fully functional IoT network should exist
in the testbed and the goal is to gather as much information at every point as we can about
the components. Databases will be used at various points to store different kinds of data at
different components, including, in some cases, the network traffic. The security aspect
of the testbed also should be such that there is opportunity to test both known and novel
vulnerabilities. The testbed should also have adaptability so that it can be easily tweaked
around and updated with industry requirements and technological advancements.
3.2 Network Setup
With the research goals in mind, the initial rough plan for the test network is showing in
Fig. 3.1. Simply put, different types of sensors and actuators or end devices/appliances
will be connected to a gateway that can accommodate different kinds of radio protocols
to receive the data from them (e.g. Bluetooth Low Energy, ZigBee, Wifi, LoRa etc.) and
uploads all the data with any of the usual IoT messaging protocols that are used widely for
IoT implementations, to a cloud platform from where, for example, the sensor data can be
visualized or monitored.
3.2 Network Setup 39
Figure 3.1. Planned network architecture
The architecture of the implemented network with the detailed hardware components are
shown in Fig. 2.10. As mentioned before, through this setup, we want to expose as many
attack vectors as possible, especially over the air interface. Hence it was important for
us to use multiple radio protocols working simultaneously. We have used the three radio
technologies that we have described briefly beforehand. There is the ZigBee protocol
which is based on the IEEE 802.15.4 specification, we have used the 802.15.4 protocol
itself and we have also used the Bluetooth protocol. The goal was to have a gateway
connecting all the end devices and the other nodes to the internet, hence a gateway that
supports multiple protocols at the same time was perhaps the most important piece of the
puzzle.
The sensor nodes will send measurements from different sensors connected over different
radio protocols and all the data will be stored locally at the gateway itself as well as be
uploaded in the cloud for visualization and analytics. The visualization and monitoring
can be done remotely over the web. The gateway is also connected to a robotic arm (UR3)
by Universal Robots. It has been configured to send minimal control messages over the
TCP/IP socket to the robotic arm to simulate the Industrial Internet of Things part as
closely as possible and creating another link for testing purposes. Each part of the network
and the links between each component of the network has been described more in detail in
the following parts of the thesis. The data/messaging protocols that have been used are
also important in the scope of the thesis because a detailed security evaluation needed to
be done to justify the use of that protocol looking at the amount and the kind of data we
were using it for. In Fig. 3.2, we have shown the physical setup of the testbed.
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Figure 3.2. Physical setup
3.2.1 Sensor Nodes/End Devices
ZigBee Sensor Node
This particular sensor node will have an Arduino UNO which will be connected to a
DHT22 sensor that collects humidity and temperature data. There will be a Digi XBee
S2C also connected to the UNO. The sketch we are using on the Arduino is taking the
temperature and humidity data and instead of just printing it to the serial terminal, it is
constructing an API frame that is specific to XBee communication and then sending the
payload wirelessly over the ZigBee channel. This is being done so that the XBee’s can be
set up in API mode and more advanced setup can be done on the XBee software level. In
API mode, the XBees can communicate with each other with predefined or preconfigured
frames which is going to be useful in the later stages of the thesis. There is an option to
use a sister-protocol of the MQTT service called MQTT-SN [99] which would use the
same pub/sub technique through a broker but for the sake of simplicity, we have just used
the API frames that are sent over an interval to the gateway. The Arduinos used for the
setup will be powered with 9V batteries so that we get mobility and we can independently
deploy the sensor nodes anywhere within the communication range. We can also use the
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battery powered sensor node for testing power depletion attacks later on. The Arduino is
used just to create the proper frame, taking data from the sensor and feed it to the XBee so
that it can be transported over the air, and hence is sufficient as a component in the scope
of this thesis.
Bluetooth Sensor Node
The other sensor node will consist of an Arduino, another DHT22 temperature and humidity
sensor and an HC-05 Bluetooth Low Energy module. The Arduino is going to have a very
similar function to the other sensor node which will read the temperature and humidity
data and push it to the serial interface which will be connected to the Bbluetooth module.
It will keep publishing/writing the data after a specific time interval. While setting it up,
the default Bluetooth device address is acquired. The name of the device and the default
PIN or password is setup by using the compatible AT commands after putting the HC-05
in command mode. These details will be required for the later use while sending the
data from the sensor node to the gateway. This node is also battery powered for remote
deployment [88].
TelosB Mote/MTM-CM5000-MSP Module
The mote will be deployed remotely and another mote will be connected to the gateway,
which will connect as the base station and fetch all the sensor data from the remotely
deployed mote. The setup will be done with the help of TinyOS. The acquired data will
then be uploaded onto the cloud along with other end device readings.
3.2.2 UR3 Robotic Arm
The Universal Robots UR3 is a cost-effective robotic arm [100] that supports 6-axis
capabilities and it can perform numerous tasks such as pick-and-place, screwing etc. It
is considered to be a collaborative robotic arm. We are using the UR Scripts, which is
based on Python, to send commands over the TCP/IP socket to make the robot do some
basic movements. It gives our testbed a very useful feature of emulating the critical IIoT
systems.
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Figure 3.3. UR3 robotic arm
3.2.3 Gateway Node
The gateway, in this network, has to play a very versatile role in order for an internet
connected IoT network to be fully and properly functional. Some of the tasks that it has
to carry out include transformation and normalization of the data since the data collected
or generated by the sensor nodes is in disparate formats. All the heterogeneous data from
different kinds of sensors is standardised so that all of it is understood in the same way
at the next stage of the data processing pipeline. Another major task gateway does is the
transformation of the protocols. Sensor nodes are often resource-constrained hence they
use low-power communication protocols such as ZigBee or BLE. However, the gateway
mostly supports multiple protocols, even in its minimal functionality, so that it can accept
the inbound data transmitted by the sensor nodes and then transmit that data outbound,
to the cloud using Ethernet or Wi-Fi etc. When it comes to IoT, some of the most used
protocols used for outbound communication by the gateway are REST, MQTT, CoAP,
STOMP etc. Gateways also act as Edge nodes, in a way, hiding the sensor nodes from the
public internet. The sensor nodes cannot be accessed directly and can only be accessed
through the gateway devices. Hence the gateway not only routes the data from the local
network to the cloud but also provides some sort of protection to the network.
For this particular setup, the gateway has three inbound data streams using three different
protocols. Our gateway device of choice is the Raspberry Pi 3 b+. Firstly, the XBee radio
is connected to Pi as a serial device through USB, as well as the MTM-CM5000-MSP
module. The Bluetooth data is received by the inbuilt Bluetooth module of the 3 b+ model.
The python file that reads the data categorises it depending on the wireless standard and
stores it into a username/password secured local MySQL database instance. It will push the
data into the database into a JSON format where the columns would be such as temperature
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and humidity or other readings that the sensors are reading. At the same time, the data is
published as three different topics for each radio protocol on the Eclipse Mosquitto MQTT
broker on a selected port. The Pi is connected to the internet and the broker port can be
accessed over the internet with the Pi’s IP address as well as the port. Then Depending on
which topic the user/cloud device subscribes to, they can have access to that particular data
stream. Hence, as mentioned before, the Pi is collecting all the sensor data and making
it available to the cloud and working as a multi-protocol gateway. The data can also be
bi-directional as the TelosB mote has functionality for controlling the onboard sensors
with on/off messages.
The gateway is also using the UR-Scripts over TCP/IP socket to send simple control
messages to a robotic arm. This opens up another potential attack vector or just expands
the number of different types of connections the gateway has to various sensors and
appliances hence making it a well-rounded IoT gateway. (Will expand a little more here
with more specific information)
The gateway itself can also be controlled from the web by simply logging into the system
through SSH with the proper authentication credentials. However, the plan is to connect
the gateway to a cloud computing platform securely and access the gateway through that
platform, for both the MQTT data and SSH access, so that the gateway itself has limited
exposure to the open internet.
Figure 3.4. Gateway node
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3.2.4 Cloud
Initially, a local instance of the Thingsboard platform was run on the gateway Raspberry
Pi itself. With the help of an access token, the payload was being fed as telemetry data
through MQTT which was being visualized on a custom IoT dashboard as shown in Fig.
3.5. However, even with just one sensor, it was too resource heavy for the Raspberry Pi.
However it was useful for the initial familiarisation with such IoT visualisation platforms
and how the generic rule chains work, as shown in Fig. 3.6. There were different features
already set in the rule chain, for example, if any of the readings are out of a certain range,
it would trigger an alarm system where the user would get an email.
Figure 3.5. Thingsboard dashboard
After much consideration, it was decided that this can be achieved better with Grafana
which is another data visualisation and monitoring platform which supports numerous
databases. It was pertinent that we use a time-series database so that we could utilize the
data streams along with their time index and better monitoring or analytics can be done at
a later stage. For this reason, InfluxDB was picked as the preferred time-series database. It
also has good support with Grafana. Because of the resource constraints of the raspberry
pi, for the testbed, the Raspberry Pi was connected to a cloud CentOS instance provided by
UpCloud cloud computing platform. The only requirement after this was to use an MQTT
client on the cloud system to subscribe to the Raspberry Pi’s MQTT broker’s published
topics.
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Figure 3.6. Thingsboard rulechain
In the following portion, we describe that components that make up the cloud part of the
network. The components are shown in Fig. 3.7 and are then discussed in detail.
Figure 3.7. Detailed diagram of the cloud system
UpCloud System
UpCloud is a cloud hosting platform which is used to run virtual servers [101]. On the
platform, creation, hosting and management of servers, storages and IP addresses are done.
One of their data centres is present in Helsinki. There are different services that can be
subscribed to depending on the requirement of resources and applications. They also have
API support and the API client applications that are used for automation of regular tasks
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on cloud such as creating new servers and to abstract the end user from the cloud service.
InfluxDB
InfluxDB is a time series database that has capabilities of handling high write and query
loads [102]. It can be used to store large amounts of timestamped data dealing with
application metrics, IoT sensor data, and real-time analytics etc. locally or in cloud. It
offers high performance and high speed datastore and uses queries similar to SQL that make
it easy to query aggregated data. The version that we use for our purposes is completely
open source.
Docker
Docker is a tool that enables containerised applications to be created, deployed and run.
Containers are applications packaged with all the required components that they need to run
independently, like libraries, dependencies etc. That brings scalability and flexibility across
different Linux environments, regardless of whatever customised settings that system has,
that are different from the system it was developed on. Many parallels can be drawn
between docker and virtual machines purpose-wise but docker makes it more efficient
since the whole operating system doesn’t have to be replicated for the application to run
on other platforms. Docker is widely used and is open source with an active support
community [103].
Grafana
Grafana is a metric analytics and visualisation tool [104]. It is often used for visualisation
of any time-series data-streams or databases. Grafana is also helpful in domains such as
home automation, industrial IoT and process control etc. It is very useful for IoT sensor
visualisation and analytics and has direct support for databases like MySQL, Postgres,
InfluxDB, etc. and tools like ElasticSearch.
Grafana also enables user to create simple panels and dashboards for visualisation. Multiple
features such as graphs, tables, different statistical representations can be created on the
tool. Being open source, it has official community built plug-ins that offer more versatility
with the already existing tools.
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4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we perform different attacks on the network and evaluate the security
features of the different components of the network.
4.1 Attacks and Security Evaluation
In the network, especially because it features different wireless and messaging protocols,
as well as different interfaces, there are many potential surfaces where the network can be
attacked. In Fig. 4.1, we show the basic setup of the network with respect to all the attack
surfaces on the network that we have attempted to exploit. We first exploited the ZigBee
channel using the software defined radio and we were able to make a malicious node
connect to the network subsequently. Eventually we were able to carry multiple malicious
changes/alterations to the network which we have talked about more in detail in the next
part of this chapter. With the software defined radio, there being multiple possibilities,
it is also useful to test the other radio interfaces at play like BLE and the IEEE 802.15.4
which the ZigBee protocol is based on. However, it is not that just the air interface was
vulnerable to such attacks but even the messaging protocol MQTT had its own limitations
in its basic implementation. Since all the services on the cloud platform was accessible
from all over the internet to anyone with the right credentials, that was also a preferred
surface of attack. As we go on with this chapter, we break down all the attacks and try to
assess on how the security of the testbed can be made stronger. For the limited timeline of
the thesis, other attacks on other surfaces were not carried out.
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Figure 4.1. Different attack vectors/surfaces on the testbed
4.1.1 ZigBee Attack
In this section, we perform some attacks on the ZigBee interface in order to compromise
the network.
Sniffing Traffic with Software Defined Radio
As mentioned before, we have used the USRP B210 software defined radio by Ettus
Research for this particular action. We also used the GR-IEEE802.15.4 by Bastian Bloessl
[105] for the software implementation. It provides a ZigBee transceiver software stack that
has an O-QPSK(Offset Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying) PHY, CSS(Chirp Spread Spectrum)
PHY that are encapsulated in hierarchical blocks. All of them have to be compiled before
running the transceiver block. The Rime stack is used for this implementation. In order to
use this, however, we first had to install all the GNU Radio components as well as UHD
which is the device driver for USRP devices. We also used gr-foo which is an additional
component of the software stack which blocks the PDUs (Protocol Data Unit) at the output
as a PCAP which can be examined with any network monitoring tool. We have used
Wireshark for this purpose. The packets are directly piped to the tool. The PCAP files are
later opened for the traffic monitoring.
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Rime Stack:
The Rime Stack is a communication stack that is light weight and effective for our purposes.
It was mainly designed for wireless sensor networks and is part of the Contiki environment
[106]. It provides lightweight communication primitives starting from anonymous local
area broadcast to reliable network flooding. The layers in the protocol are such that the
complex protocols can be implemented in relatively simpler ways. The primitives used in
this network stack are quite compatible for the scope of sensor network implementations
given the protocols and the applications. Any of the primitives can be utilised easily by
just having the application operating in the accurate layer. It has support for single as well
as multi-hop communication primitives. The routing protocols are made flexible through
the multi-hop primitives. Protocols that are not already within the stack can be used as
additional features by another protocol or application already running on the stack.
The transceiver software module functions by connecting different parts of the puzzle
together. For example, the chain works in the following way, USRP : PHY : MAC :
Rime Network Layer : UDP Socket / APP, subsequently replicating the OSI model quite
efficiently and accurately with full modulation capabilities. As mentioned before, since
both TelosB motes and the Rime Stack as well as the GR-IEEE-802.15.4 module support
the Contiki platform, they are both interpolatable with the TelosB compliant motes as well.
Since we are using it in the network as well, it is particularly useful.
The functional GNURadio Companion block diagram is shown in Fig. 4.2 for the
transceiver module. The central frequency is set to 2.425 GHz, which is the operational
frequency of the XBee. The PAN is also set according to the XBee network setup.
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Figure 4.2. The ZigBee tranceiver on GNU Radio Companion
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Security Framework of XBee:
The XBee ZB modules come equipped with their own security features. Through the
XCTU software, there are different parameters that can be set for different levels of
security for the XBee to XBee communication over the ZigBee channel. Each XBee, is
represented by a panel on XCTU that is shown in Fig. 4.3, that deals with the security
enforcement of the modules. First option that needs to be set is called the Encryption
Option or the EO. If it is set to zero, then it means that there is no security or encryption
system at play and all the traffic is being sent over the air unencrypted, hence majorly
susceptible to eavesdropping and interception. Hence, we of course set the EO option to
one, which means that there would be a network key. We set the network key or the NK to
"ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff" for experimental purposes. This value for the XBee
modules is only writeable and cannot be read in order to keep the network key secure.
The KY or the Encryption Key feature enables the Trust Center security. There is another
type of Link key called the APS Link key. The Trust Center Link Key is set by putting
any value in place of KY. This particular key is used to encrypt the other data transfers
including the initial network key transfer. The TC Link Key uses 128-bit AES encryption.
Figure 4.3. The XBee security options on XCTU
In Fig. 2.8, we have shown how the APS or the Application Support Sublayer is placed.
Now to get into more details, the security in this layer works in a way that with the help of
a particular key, any two devices can communicate with each other with full encryption
without either one of them being the trust center. This also uses 128-bit AES encryption.
The APS frame structure is shown in Fig. 4.4. However, this kind of security does not
apply to broadcast messages and only works in a unicast setting.
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Figure 4.4. The APS frame structure
The XBee documentation states that when KY is set to zero and EO is set to a value which
activates the trust center requires a trust center link key, the link key is set to a random
128-bit AES link key from a list of keys. Even though it has an assigned link key, it does
not transmit the network key encrypted with this link key. We were able to exploit the
feature as when we started capturing the traffic on the XBee channel. When we started
analysing the PCAP file, as seen in Fig. 4.5, we could see that the network key and the
trust center link key was easily captured with the B210. Most of the information about the
ZigBee radio nodes, like the hex payload being transferred, the MAC addresses and the
PAN IDs were also visible.
Figure 4.5. Wireshark capture file With random TC Link Key
For scalability and testing purposes, we set the trust center link key to two different univer-
sal keys that are used for Home Automation and the ZigBee Light Link, that have been
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known/published in the public domain. The home automation default trust center link key
being ZigBeeAlliance09 or ’5A:69:67:42:65:65:41:6C:6C:69 :61:6E:63:65:30:39’ in hex-
adecimal format. The ZLL Master Key is known to be ’9F:55:95:F1:02:57:C8:A4:69:CB:F4
:2B:C9:3F:EE:31’ [107][108]. This way, the testbed could add different home automation
devices like ZigBee compliant light bulbs or Home Automation hubs and communicate
with them. However, since these keys are public knowledge, they cause serious problems
with the security of the systems. The network key is sent to the joining nodes over the air,
encrypted with the link key. Upon analysing the PCAP, we find the APS packages where it
does not show the network key and it can be seen that the key transport is encrypted as
seen in Fig. 4.6.
Figure 4.6. Wireshark capture file with encrypted payload
Wireshark has the inbuilt functionality, where, if we add the link key, it decrypts the packets
where the network key is hidden. Hence, after adding the link key to Wireshark, again, we
can see the network key and all the other relevant information without even joining the
network, hence putting in use a competent sniffer. After the decryption, it looks the same
as in Fig. 4.7. Where the information can be retrieved from the Transport Key packets.
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Figure 4.7. Wireshark capture file with decrypted payload
After the decryption, the other APS packets which carry the information are providing the
network key in plain text as seen in Fig. 4.8.
Figure 4.8. Wireshark capture file
After getting the information, the network was further exploited using the AT command
feature built into the XBees. Since we know the security details of the network, with
another XBee module, we could join the network easily and send different kinds of packets
to any of the nodes of the network with the MAC addresses of the devices. We used another
XBee to connect to the network and pose as a legitimate sensor node.
First, through the XCTU, we sent some hexadecimal streams of data to the coordinator
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after studying the payload that was being sent from the sensor nodes to the coordinator. A
little bit of alteration to the message payload would still make it seem authentic. However,
we were able to activate the alarms set in place by pushing fake temperature data. By doing
that, we could set off different alarms that were included in the rule chains.
At commands or Attention commands are used to configure modems or radio devices.
The frame structure of AT commands are shown in Fig. 4.9. For XBee devices, the AT
commands do not have dedicated authentication system. If nodes are in the same network,
any node can send commands to the other XBee devices in the network using the remote
AT command feature. Hence after getting access to the network, using the attacker node,
we were able to send different remote AT commands at first to the actual ZigBee sensor
node. The XBee I/O pins can read and sample analogue and digital I/O lines which can be
manipulated through the commands. The whole configuration information of the XBee
device can retrieved or the device can be simply turned off. After turning off the devices,
the attacker XBee can pose as the original sensor and keep on feeding fake data and metrics
to the coordinator.
However, the coordinator was also successfully replaced when we sent the remote AT
command for resetting, which is done by sending the command with the RE parameter to
the MAC address of the coordinator node. It forces the coordinator to reset. During this
time, if the malicious node copies all the configuration parameters of the coordinator and
does a network reset, it can pose as the new coordinator. Once this is done, a network reset
will trigger the nodes to connect to the coordinator again.
The network can be manipulated or exploited in multiple ways depending on the attacker’s
purpose. It also depends on what kind of real-world deployment the attacker is trying to
infiltrate seeing as, for example, in Home Automation setups, the security enforcements
are often very weak.
When it comes to XBee networks, for remote updates and maintenance, shell access can
also be enabled through XBees. In this scenario, the operating system that is running
the coordinator would be vulnerable if it is facing the open internet as the IP would be
exposed to search engines like SHODAN. Then it would all come down to how strong the
username/password authentication is, of that particular system.
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Figure 4.9. The AT command frame structure for XBees
4.1.2 Exploiting Default MQTT Settings
Even though MQTT is used often in IoT deployments, there are some security gaps when
it comes to the protocol itself when it is used in its default settings as it does not enforce
proper security features in that case. Which, in turn, creates a lot of possibilities for various
vulnerabilities such as completely compromised privacy, Man-in-The-Middle [109] attacks
and Denial of Service attacks [110, 111].
Eclipse Mosquitto, the broker that we have used in our network, by default, works on the
TCP port 1883. This port does not have Transport Layer Security protocol and all the
traffic that was available on this port was unencrypted. This subsequently made all the
topics available to the internet without any sort of safeguard. Hence through SHODAN
visibility, all the topics being published by the broker can be subscribed to by any device
from all over the internet, with a simple script using an MQTT client. We managed to
subscribe to all the topic without knowing what topics there were, as we posed to be an
unauthorised subscriber. Hence not only the privacy of the data was at stake, the same way
control messages could be sent to critical IoT devices that can cause significant damage to
businesses or users.
4.1.3 Honeypot Library Creation and Deployment
As mentioned before, honeypots play an important role in providing insight on what kind
of attacks the systems connected to the open internet are subject to. There is a wide variety
of honeypots depending on functionality. There are also a lot of open source honeypots
available online. However, deployment of said honeypots can become difficult sometimes
because many of them do not have constant maintenance and updates. Hence with systems
that are different or more advanced than the systems that the honeypots were developed
on, very often do not work well with the deployment. During the work for the thesis, we
set out to create a library of different Linux system images running a different honeypot
on each of them with full functionality. Because of the aforementioned problems, most
of the honeypots needed a lot of tweaking and modification, either directly or with their
dependencies, to run properly. The goal was to have easily deployable images which can
be used at any point to get information about the kind of attacks that are taking place.
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The main reason behind creating the images was to have honeypots with different features
and functionalities so that we could get different kinds of data from each of them, depending
on the feature. Another major reason was to be able to deploy different honeypots every
now and then so that chances of attackers detecting honeypot usage were less.
The library contains 8 system images, based on either Raspbian Stretch (Debian) or Kali
Linux or Ubuntu. Functionality wise, we focus on mainly three ports, TELNET, SSH and
FTP. Most of the honeypots are listening to at least one of the three ports. However, all of
them have unique features and some of them vary when it comes to the level of interaction.
We have listed all the deployed honeypots and provided a brief description of the system
in the following part.
Kippo:
Kippo is a Medium Interaction Honeypot made for the SSH port. It was designed to log
malicious login and brute force attempts. It creates a fake file-system where the attacker
can add/remove files and carry out some basic commands. The fake system replicates a
Debian 5.0 system and use usual methods of acquiring passwords through ’cat’ commands.
All the interaction is logged and there are supported visualisation scripts like Kippo-Graph.
The honeypot was deployed on Kali Linux 2018 for ARM processors [112].
Cowrie:
Cowrie is another Medium Interaction Honeypot that is based on Kippo. It has slightly
better support because it is maintained more since it is a later iteration. Cowrie saves all
files that are downloaded with curl or wget and files that have been uploaded with SCP or
SFTP for later analysis. There are a few additional features that Cowrie offers over Kippo.
It supports file upload with SFTP and SCP as mentioned before. It also supports logging
of direct TCP connection attempts through proxying. It can forward SMTP connections to
SMTP honeypots and it logs in JSON format, hence processing the logs become easier. It
also supports SSH exec commands [113].
Kojoney2:
It was developed at the University of Pennsylvania’s School of Arts and Sciences by Jose
Antonio Coret. It is the second version of previously deployed Kojoney honeypot. Ko-
joney2 is a Medium Interaction SSH honeypot that is write in python. It uses the Twisted
Conch libraries. There is an editable list of fake users and passwords and the simulated
SSH environment authenticates login attempts comparing the credentials with the list.
Most common attack credentials are on the list and hence the connections are successfully
authenticated. The attackers then get access to the simulated shell to execute different
commands. It is a good tool for post-compromise behaviour by the attackers. Malicious
scripts are also downloaded for later analyses [114].
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MTPot:
MTPot is another effective open source honeypot. It was developed by Cymmetria Research
in 2016. It has some unique features that help us get a better view of how the IoT
malware Mirai works. Even though it is not capable of downloading or running malware
in safeguarded environments, the behaviour of the attack is observed to see whether it
matches with typical behaviour of Mirai. Mirai first looks for Busybox upon connecting to
the system. Similarly, it classifies different families of attack methods. MTPot is written in
Python and it provides an elaborate visualisation extension for the results [115].
Twisted-Honeypots:
This is a low interaction honeypot that works by emulating different ports such as SSH,
FTP and Telnet. It is based on the Twisted framework and written in Python. All the data
are stored in a local MySQL database. We have talked more about this particular honeypot
in details while the deployment process [116].
IoT-Telnet Honeypot:
This is Telnet service honeypot based on python that acts as a tool to observe IoT Malware
attacks. This also emulates a real shell environment. This follows a simple client-server
setup. The client or the the honeypot accepts telnet connections and the server receives the
information about the connections and represents them. The back-end server, requiring
an SQL database, uses HTTP to access the frontend. There is a plugin that allows use
of Cowrie as a replacement for the built-in honeypot, since Cowrie has more advanced
features. This honeypot is capable of complex linking mechanisms for the analysis part
and assesses the malware type as well [117].
HonTel:
HonTel is a Telnet honeypot and it creates a ’chroot’ [118] virtual environment, creating a
fake file system with root privileges that the attacker directly interacts with, by changing
the location of the root directory. Hence tricking the attacker into thinking that it is a real
system [119].
Honeyperl:
This is a honeypot based on Perl. There are multiple plugins that allow support for different
services like TELNET, SMTP, etc. It hasn’t had maintenance in quite some time and the
last updates were from many years ago hence there could be some vulnerabilities within
the honeypot deployment [120].
Twisted-Honeypots Deployment
We deployed the Twisted-Honeypots that work as a honeypot for SSH, Telnet and FTP
services. It is a Low Interaction Honeypot that logs different login and brute force attempts.
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We changed the default SSH port of the system to 2222 from 22 to access the system and
then deployed the honeypot. It uses a MySQL database to store all the attack information
in different categories. There are 3 different python scripts for each service. For example,
when advertising the SSH service, it picks a random name from a list of different SSH
services that are for different Linux environments. It emulates the services with the help
of the Twisted [121] framework. Twisted is an event driven networking engine that helps
emulate the different network services. The deployment is fully based on Python3. The
reason behind choosing this honeypot was that this has had updates fairly recently. It is
comparatively simple to deploy, and the functionality serves the purpose for our scope. The
services use strong authentication like public/private RSA keys so that attackers cannot
log into those environments. We have described and done an analysis of the results of the
deployed honeypot in the later sections of the thesis.
4.2 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the potential mitigation techniques and other preventive and
observational measures in line with the practical work that we conducted. Apart from that,
the results of the honeypot deployment are also discussed and analysed. Lastly, we talk
about where the future of this research is headed and what are the things that can be done
to advance the testbed capabilities for more wholesome security testing.
4.2.1 Mitigation
In this section, we talk about possible ways to be preventive when it comes to such attacks.
Of course general awareness, and strong authentication credentials must be used for all the
services running on open ports are important factors.
4.2.2 ZigBee Attack Mitigation
In the previous section, we found many vulnerabilities for the ZigBee portion of the
network. For the ZigBee interface, the security settings that we used for our test setup
was exploitable with attack methods we used. The XBee software suite (XCTU) provides
stronger security features. For example, using custom a Trust Center Link Key, set up
by the user for each of the XBee nodes would provide more security as the network key
would be transported with proper encryption. However, that might make it more complex
for the network to pair with other Home Automation devices or consumer products such as
ZigBee light bulbs with their default settings. An extra level of authentication for the AT
commands feature would also be useful. The XCTU also provides a username/password
authentication for each node to join a network. Hence, we see that the trade-off between
strong security and network complexity remains a big factor.
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4.2.3 MQTT Exploitation Prevention
For the MQTT protocol, we had to enforce different features which are not used with the
default settings of the broker. The broker comes with the feature of a username/password
authentication that can be invoked in the code. All the parties subscribing to the broker
must authenticate with the proper credentials in order to access the data. However, brute-
force scripts that use a list of usernames and passwords can be used to exploit such a
system depending on how secure the credentials are.
Instead of using the default 1883 port, the port 8883 is standardised for "secure-MQTT"
which uses the Transport Layer Security protocol which also prevents eavesdropping,
sniffing, etc. Since the computation overhead increases with this, we added another layer
of security instead by simply creating a secure VPN tunnel with openVPN [122] so that
the system that the broker is running on isn’t available to the open internet. Hence it does
not appear on the search results of SHODAN and can only be accessed through the VPN
server. The VPN server itself is secure and all the traffic that goes through the tunnel is
encrypted.
4.2.4 Honeypot Results and Analysis
Within just a week of having deployed the honeypot, we used the monitor feature of
honeypot to visualise the detailed results. By this time already, there were more than fifty
two thousand attempts to access the system. Below, we have shown the different sorts of
information the honeypot provided us. Firstly, as shown in Fig. 4.10, it shows the details
of the login attempts for different services. It has information about the address of the
system and the credentials that were used to access the service.
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Figure 4.10. Different attacks captured by honeypot
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There is also a section where the attackers’ IPs are sorted according to the geographical
area. Of course, there is no way of telling how accurate this is because the attacker might
be using a proxy or a VPN. It is interesting to see the distribution nonetheless in Fig. 4.11.
Figure 4.11. IP mapping of the attack source location
There are three different sections in Fig. 4.12, showing the most commonly used usernames
like root, admin, etc. passwords such as 1234, 12345, admin, etc. It also lists the most
popular username/password combination which also interesting to say the least.
Figure 4.12. Most popular combinations for usernames and passwords
Looking at the frequency of attempts from the same addresses, it is fairly easy to tell that
these are scripts that scan internet-facing devices and use credentials from a list of probable
credentials or simple brute forcing techniques. Within such a short period of time, it gives
us a very clear idea of how the devices over the internet are under constant attacks and how
default or non-secure username and passwords can make systems very easily penetrable.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The testbed was developed for security testing. It has three wireless protocols working on
it, ZigBee, Bluetooth and base IEEE 802.15.4 and it provides a robust testing environment
over the air-interface. It also exposes other various surfaces which can create vulnerability
for the network. Our goal was to also to put in basic security features and to test how they
fared against our attacks. For that, we mainly focussed on the ZigBee interface.
With the Software Defined Radio and the required firmware, sniffing or eavesdropping was
possible. Multiple attacks were done subsequently, including command injection, MITM
and Denial of Service attacks. Hence the ZigBee part of the network was completely
compromised and paving way for further attacks.
The exploitation of MQTT was also discussed with its default settings. The privacy of the
topics that are published was easily compromised and there are further attack methods that
can be explored later.
Mitigation for both the attacks have been proposed but to observe some of the kinds of
attack and threats the IoT devices and systems face, we also set up a honeypot library and
discussed the results of one honeypot that was deployed.
IoT security will keep on being a complex topic because of the heterogeneity and the
massive variety of products but the industry awareness has been increasing lately. However,
more focus might be a requirement for across-the-board security strengthening of IoT.
Not just the system administrators’ competence, but also the consumer awareness is an
extremely important part. For example, the users have to pay attention to securing their
devices and not use default usernames and passwords.
The testbed provided us with a far better understanding, practically, of how the security
aspect can be full of complexities. Hence, the main goal of the research was achieved. The
network that we created, however, has to be adaptable and accommodate many current and
future advancements in the field of IoT. Some of the future possibilities are mentioned in
the following part.
5.1 Future Work
The testbed needs to accommodate more features and more testing opportunities and needs
to adapt constantly. In this section, we try to pave the way for how it can advance and
address more security related issues when it comes to Internet of Things. While expansion
of the testbed is an obvious way forward with more diverse technologies and protocols
relevant to IoT, the following are also considered as additional desirable features.
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5.1.1 Different Kinds of Attacks
Due to the time constraints of the thesis work, we could not carry out more test cases.
There are multiple protocols and known vulnerabilities that can be further exploited with
existing and novel attacks from different surfaces.
5.1.2 Making the Testbed Accessible
It would be beneficial to make the project open-source and have security enthusiasts and
IoT developers’ community to be able to create different kinds of test scenarios. That can
be achieved by making the testbed accessible over the web and allow control of all the
nodes with proper logging and reset options in place with backed up images and periodic
flashing of said images.
5.1.3 Testbed Twin
It would also be very beneficial to have a functional digital twin system of the whole
testbed where the virtual counterparts are doing two-way data transfer and are connected
to the digital instances of all the nodes.
5.1.4 Intelligent Testbed
One of the next steps would also be to use specific Machine Learning models and Artificial
Intelligence to do advanced threat analyses of the network and have proper intrusion
detection mechanisms in place. Also have features such as intelligent honeypot learning
from stored interactions/transactions between the nodes/attackers in databases.
65
REFERENCES
[1] “Gartner Identifies Top 10 Strategic IoT Technologies and Trends,” 2018.
[Online]. Available: https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/
2018-11-07-gartner-identifies-top-10-strategic-iot-technologies-and-trends
[2] J. Granjal, E. Monteiro, and J. Sá Silva, “Security for the Internet of Things:
A Survey of Existing Protocols and Open Research Issues,” IEEE COMMUNI-
CATION SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. 17, NO. 3, THIRD QUARTER 2015,
2015.
[3] J. Deogirikar and A. Vidhate, “Security attacks in IoT: A survey,” in 2017
International Conference on I-SMAC (IoT in Social, Mobile, Analytics and Cloud)
(I-SMAC), Feb 2017, pp. 32–37.
[4] “Leading the IoT : Gartner Insights on How to Lead in a Connected
World,” January 2017. [Online]. Available: http://www.surfline.com/surf-news/
maldives-surf-access-controversy-update_75296/
[5] T. Dimitriou and A. Michalas, “Multi-party trust computation in decentralized en-
vironments,” in 2012 5th International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility
and Security (NTMS), May 2012, pp. 1–5.
[6] ——, “Multi-party trust computation in decentralized environments in the
presence of malicious adversaries,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 15, pp. 53–66, Apr.
2014. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2013.04.013
[7] A. Michalas and N. Komninos, “The lord of the sense: A privacy preserving
reputation system for participatory sensing applications,” in Computers and
Communication (ISCC), 2014 IEEE Symposium. IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–6.
[8] A. Michalas and M. Bakopoulos, “Secgod google docs: Now i feel safer!” in
2012 International Conference for Internet Technology And Secured Transactions,
Dec 2012, pp. 589–595.
[9] C. Bockelmann, N. Pratas, H. Nikopour, K. Au, T. Svensson, C. Stefanovic,
P. Popovski, and A. Dekorsy, “Massive machine-type communications in 5g:
physical and MAC-layer solutions,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 54,
no. 9, pp. 59–65, Sep. 2016.
[10] Chih-Ping Li, Jing Jiang, W. Chen, Tingfang Ji, and J. Smee, “5G ultra-reliable
and low-latency systems design,” in 2017 European Conference on Networks and
Communications (EuCNC), June 2017, pp. 1–5.
66 References
[11] S. Li, L. Da Xu, and S. Zhao, “5G Internet of Things: A survey,” Journal of
Industrial Information Integration, vol. 10, 02 2018.
[12] M. Nawir, A. Amir, N. Yaakob, and O. B. Lynn, “Internet of Things (IoT): Tax-
onomy of security attacks,” in 2016 3rd International Conference on Electronic
Design (ICED), Aug 2016, pp. 321–326.
[13] N. Paladi, A. Michalas, and C. Gehrmann, “Domain based storage protection with
secure access control for the cloud,” in Proceedings of the 2014 International
Workshop on Security in Cloud Computing, ser. ASIACCS ’14. New York, NY,
USA: ACM, 2014.
[14] N. Paladi and A. Michalas, ““One of our hosts in another country”: Challenges
of data geolocation in cloud storage,” in Wireless Communications, Vehicular
Technology, Information Theory and Aerospace Electronic Systems (VITAE), 2014
4th International Conference on, May 2014, pp. 1–6.
[15] Y. Verginadis, A. Michalas, P. Gouvas, G. Schiefer, G. HÃŒbsch, and
I. Paraskakis, “Paasword: A holistic data privacy and security by design frame-
work for cloud services,” in Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on
Cloud Computing and Services Science, 2015, pp. 206–213.
[16] Y. Verginadis, A. Michalas, P. Gouvas, G. Schiefer, G. Hübsch, and I. Paraskakis,
“Paasword: A holistic data privacy and security by design framework for cloud
services,” Journal of Grid Computing, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 219–234, Jun 2017.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10723-017-9394-2
[17] N. Paladi, A. Michalas, and H.-V. Dang, “Towards secure cloud orchestration
for multi-cloud deployments,” in Proceedings of the 5th Workshop
on CrossCloud Infrastructures & Platforms, ser. CrossCloud’18. New
York, NY, USA: ACM, 2018, pp. 4:1–4:6. [Online]. Available: http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/3195870.3195874
[18] H. Flatt, S. Schriegel, J. Jasperneite, H. Trsek, and H. Adamczyk, “Analysis
of the Cyber-Security of industry 4.0 technologies based on RAMI 4.0 and
identification of requirements,” in 2016 IEEE 21st International Conference on
Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA), Sep. 2016, pp. 1–4.
[19] P. Sethi and S. R. Sarangi, “Internet of Things: Architectures, Protocols, and
Applications,” Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering Volume 2017,
2017.
[20] K. Ashton, “That “Internet of Things” Thing: In the Real World Things Matter
More than Ideas,” RFID Journal, 2009.
67
[21] K. Y. Yigzaw, A. Michalas, and J. G. Bellika, “Secure and scalable deduplication
of horizontally partitioned health data for privacy-preserving distributed statistical
computation,” BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making, vol. 17, no. 1,
p. 1, 2017. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12911-016-0389-x
[22] G. Akpakwu, B. Silva, G. P. Hancke, and A. Abu-Mahfouz, “A Survey on
5G Networks for the Internet of Things: Communication Technologies and
Challenges,” vol. PP, pp. 1–1, 12 2017.
[23] K. L. Lueth, “IoT Investments 2018: $3.3B annual funding, record number
of startup exits,” 10 2018. [Online]. Available: https://iot-analytics.com/
iot-investments-m-and-a-market-update-2018/
[24] A. Michalas, N. Paladi, and C. Gehrmann, “Security aspects of e-health systems
migration to the cloud,” in e-Health Networking, Applications and Services
(Healthcom), 2014 IEEE 16th International Conference on. IEEE, 2014, pp.
212–218.
[25] S. Z. Shancang Li, Li Da Xu, “5G Internet of Things: A Survey,” in Journal of
Industrial Information Integration, Sep. 2018.
[26] M. Muntjir, M. Rahul, and H. Alhumiany, “An Analysis of Internet of
Things(IoT): Novel Architectures, Modern Applications,Security Aspects and
Future Scope with Latest Case Studies,” Building Services Engineering Research
and Technology, vol. 6, 06 2017.
[27] M. Yun and B. Yuxin, “Research on the architecture and key technology of
Internet of Things (IoT) applied on smart grid,” 2010 International Conference
on Advances in Energy Engineering, pp. 69–72, 2010.
[28] A. Al-Fuqaha, M. Guizani, M. Mohammadi, M. Aledhari, and M. Ayyash, “In-
ternet of Things: A Survey on Enabling Technologies, Protocols, and Applica-
tions,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 2347–2376,
Fourthquarter 2015.
[29] B. N. Silva, M. Khan, and K. Han, “Internet of Things: A Comprehensive
Review of Enabling Technologies, Architecture, and Challenges,” IETE
Technical Review, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 205–220, 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1080/02564602.2016.1276416
[30] D. Cook, G. Duncan, G. Sprint, and R. Fritz, “Using smart city technology to
make healthcare smarter,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. PP, pp. 1–15, 01 2018.
[31] A. Ngu, M. Gutierrez, V. Metsis, S. Nepal, and Q. Sheng, “IoT Middleware: A
Survey on Issues and Enabling Technologies,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal,
vol. PP, pp. 1–1, 10 2016.
68 References
[32] Z.-K. Zhang, M. C. Y. Cho, C.-W. Wang, C.-W. Hsu, C.-K. Chen, and
S. Shieh, “IoT Security: Ongoing Challenges and Research Opportunities,”
in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE 7th International Conference on Service-
Oriented Computing and Applications, ser. SOCA ’14. Washington, DC,
USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2014, pp. 230–234. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1109/SOCA.2014.58
[33] “Named Data Networking,” Comput. Sci. Rev., vol. 19, no. C, pp. 15–55, Feb.
2016. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cosrev.2016.01.001
[34] F. Callegati, W. Cerroni, and M. Ramilli, “Man-in-the-Middle Attack to the
HTTPS Protocol,” IEEE Security Privacy, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 78–81, Jan 2009.
[35] H. Shulman and M. Waidner, “Dnssec for cyber forensics,” EURASIP Journal
on Information Security, vol. 2014, no. 1, p. 16, Oct 2014. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13635-014-0016-2
[36] A. Michalas, “The lord of the shares: Combining attribute-based encryption
and searchable encryption for flexible data sharing,” in Proceedings of
the 34th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium on Applied Computing, ser. SAC ’19.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2019, pp. 146–155. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3297280.3297297
[37] A. Michalas and K. Y. Yigzaw, “Locless: Do you really care your cloud files
are?” in 2016 IEEE/ACM 9th International Conference on Utility and Cloud
Computing (UCC), Dec 2015, pp. 618–623.
[38] R. Dowsley, A. Michalas, M. Nagel, and N. Paladi, “A survey on design and
implementation of protected searchable data in the cloud,” Computer Science
Review, 2017. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S1574013716302167
[39] R. Dowsley, A. Michalas, and M. Nagel, “A report on design and implementation
of protected searchable data in iaas,” Swedish Institute of Computer Science
(SICS), Tech. Rep., 2016.
[40] N. Paladi, C. Gehrmann, and A. Michalas, “Providing user security guarantees
in public infrastructure clouds,” IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, vol. 5,
no. 3, pp. 405–419, July 2017.
[41] A. Michalas, “Sharing in the rain: Secure and efficient data sharing for the
cloud,” in 2016 International Conference for Internet Technology And Secured
Transactions, Dec 2016, pp. 589–595.
[42] I. Batra, A. K. Luhach, and N. Pathak, “Research and Analysis of Lightweight
Cryptographic Solutions for Internet of Things,” in Proceedings of the Second
69
International Conference on Information and Communication Technology for
Competitive Strategies, ser. ICTCS ’16. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016, pp.
23:1–23:5. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2905055.2905229
[43] M. Abomhara and G. M. Køien, “Security and privacy in the Internet of Things:
Current status and open issues,” in 2014 International Conference on Privacy
and Security in Mobile Systems (PRISMS), May 2014, pp. 1–8.
[44] R. Frederick, “Core concept: Homomorphic encryption,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, vol. 112, no. 28, pp. 8515–8516, 2015. [Online].
Available: https://www.pnas.org/content/112/28/8515
[45] V. Sharma, J. Kim, S. Kwon, I. You, K. Lee, and K. Yim, “A framework for
mitigating zero-day attacks in IoT,” CoRR, vol. abs/1804.05549, 2018. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.05549
[46] J. Zaddach, L. Bruno, A. Francillon, and D. Balzarotti, “AVATAR: A framework
to support dynamic security analysis of embedded systems’ firmwares,” in NDSS
2014, Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 23-26 February
2014, San Diego, USA, San Diego, UNITED STATES, 02 2014. [Online].
Available: http://www.eurecom.fr/publication/4158
[47] A. Michalas, N. Komninos, N. R. Prasad, and V. A. Oleshchuk, “New client
puzzle approach for dos resistance in ad hoc networks,” in Information Theory
and Information Security (ICITIS), 2010 IEEE International Conference. IEEE,
2010, pp. 568–573.
[48] A. Michalas, N. Komninos, and N. R. Prasad, “Cryptographic puzzles and game
theory against dos and ddos attacks in networks,” International Journal of Com-
puter Research, vol. 19, no. 1, p. 79, 2012.
[49] M. Antonakakis, T. April, M. Bailey, M. Bernhard, E. Bursztein, J. Cochran,
Z. Durumeric, J. A. Halderman, L. Invernizzi, M. Kallitsis, D. Kumar,
C. Lever, Z. Ma, J. Mason, D. Menscher, C. Seaman, N. Sullivan, K. Thomas,
and Y. Zhou, “Understanding the Mirai Botnet,” in Proceedings of the
26th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium, ser. SEC’17. Berkeley,
CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2017, pp. 1093–1110. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3241189.3241275
[50] K. Angrishi, “Turning Internet of Things(IoT) into Internet of Vulnerabilities
(IoV) : IoT Botnets,” CoRR, vol. abs/1702.03681, 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1702.03681
[51] W. Z. A. Zakaria and M. L. M. Kiah, “A review of dynamic and intelligent
honeypots,” 2013.
70 References
[52] E. Lee, “Computing Foundations and Practice for Cyber Physical Systems: A
Preliminary Report,” 01 2007.
[53] N. Boulila, “Cyber-Physical Systems and Industry 4.0: Properties, Structure,
Communication, and Behavior,” 04 2019.
[54] A. Canedo, “Industrial IoT lifecycle via digital twins,” in 2016 International Con-
ference on Hardware/Software Codesign and System Synthesis (CODES+ISSS),
Oct 2016, pp. 1–1.
[55] Q. Qi and F. Tao, “Digital Twin and Big Data Towards Smart Manufacturing
and Industry 4.0: 360 Degree Comparison,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 3585–3593,
2018.
[56] “Shodan,” 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.shodan.io/
[57] M. Patton, E. Gross, R. Chinn, S. Forbis, L. Walker, and H. Chen, “Uninvited
Connections: A Study of Vulnerable Devices on the Internet of Things (IoT),” in
2014 IEEE Joint Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, Sep. 2014,
pp. 232–235.
[58] J. Owens and J. Matthews, “A study of passwords and methods used in brute-force
SSH attacks,” 05 2019.
[59] I. Mokube and M. Adams, “Honeypots: concepts, approaches, and challenges.”
01 2007, pp. 321–326.
[60] M. Nawrocki, M. Wählisch, T. Schmidt, C. Keil, and J. Schönfelder, “A Survey
on Honeypot Software and Data Analysis,” 08 2016.
[61] L. Spitzner, “Honeypots: Catching the Insider Threat,” in ACSAC, 2003.
[62] A. Reziouk, E. Laurent, and J. Demay, “Practical security overview of IEEE
802.15.4,” in 2016 International Conference on Engineering MIS (ICEMIS), Sep.
2016, pp. 1–9.
[63] A. Koubaa, M. Alves, and E. Tovar, “IEEE 802.15. 4: a wireless communication
technology for large-scale ubiquitous computing applications,” 01 2006.
[64] D. Gislason, Zigbee Wireless Networking, 2008.
[65] “ZigBee Alliance. ZigBee RF4CE Specification, 1 edition, March 2009.[Online].”
[Online]. Available: http://www.zigbee.org
[66] “WIRELESS MESH NETWORKING: ZIGBEE VS. DIGIMESH,” 2018.
[67] X. Fan, F. Susan, W. R. Long, and S. Li, “Security Analysis of Zigbee,” 2017.
71
[68] S. Farahani, ZigBee Wireless Networks and Transceivers, 2008.
[69] N. Vidgren, K. Haataja, J. L. Patino-Andres, J. J. Ramirez-Sanchis, and P. Toiva-
nen, “Security Threats in ZigBee-Enabled Systems: Vulnerability Evaluation,
Practical Experiments, Countermeasures, and Lessons Learned,” 2013 46th
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, pp. 5132–5138, 2013.
[70] O. Olawumi, K. Haataja, M. Asikainen, N. Vidgren, and P. Toivanen, “Three
practical attacks against ZigBee security: Attack scenario definitions, practical
experiments, countermeasures, and lessons learned,” 2014 14th International
Conference on Hybrid Intelligent Systems, pp. 199–206, 2014.
[71] R. Krejcˇí, O. Hujnˇák, and M. Švepeš, “Security survey of the IoT wireless
protocols,” in 2017 25th Telecommunication Forum (TELFOR), Nov 2017, pp.
1–4.
[72] J. Padgette, J. Bahr, M. Batra, M. Holtmann, R. Smithbey, L. Chen, and K. Scar-
fone, “NIST Special Publication 800-121 Revision 2, Guide to Bluetooth Security,”
2017.
[73] S. Siboni, V. Sachidananda, A. Shabtai, and Y. Elovici, “Security Testbed for
the Internet of Things,” CoRR, vol. abs/1610.05971, 2016. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1610.05971
[74] C. Adjih, E. Baccelli, E. Fleury, G. Harter, N. Mitton, T. Noel, R. Pissard-Gibollet,
F. Saint-Marcel, G. Schreiner, J. Vandaele, and T. Watteyne, “FIT IoT-LAB: A
large scale open experimental IoT testbed,” in 2015 IEEE 2nd World Forum on
Internet of Things (WF-IoT), Dec 2015, pp. 459–464.
[75] M. Doddavenkatappa, M. C. Chan, and A. L. Ananda, “Indriya: A Low-Cost,
3D Wireless Sensor Network Testbed,” in Testbeds and Research Infrastructure.
Development of Networks and Communities, T. Korakis, H. Li, P. Tran-Gia, and
H.-S. Park, Eds. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012, pp.
302–316.
[76] P. Appavoo, E. K. William, M. C. Chan, and M. Mohammad, “Indriya2: A Het-
erogeneous Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) Testbed,” in Testbeds and Research
Infrastructures for the Development of Networks and Communities, H. Gao,
Y. Yin, X. Yang, and H. Miao, Eds. Cham: Springer International Publishing,
2019, pp. 3–19.
[77] G. Werner-Allen, P. Swieskowski, and M. Welsh, “Motelab: a wireless sensor
network testbed,” in IPSN 2005. Fourth International Symposium on Information
Processing in Sensor Networks, 2005., April 2005, pp. 483–488.
72 References
[78] S.-F. Li, V. Handziski, A. Köpke, M. Kubisch, and A. Wolisz, “A wireless sensor
network testbed supporting controlled in-building experiments,” 05 2019.
[79] R. Lim, F. Ferrari, M. Zimmerling, C. Walser, P. Sommer, and J. Beutel, “Flock-
Lab: A testbed for distributed, synchronized tracing and profiling of wireless
embedded systems,” in 2013 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Information
Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN), April 2013, pp. 153–165.
[80] C. Burin des Rosiers, G. Chelius, E. Fleury, A. Fraboulet, A. Gallais, N. Mitton,
and T. Noël, “SensLAB,” in Testbeds and Research Infrastructure. Development
of Networks and Communities, T. Korakis, H. Li, P. Tran-Gia, and H.-S. Park,
Eds. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 239–254.
[81] J. Cache, J. Wright, and V. Liu, Hacking Exposed Wireless: Wireless Security
Secrets and Solutions. McGraw-Hill.
[82] C. Alcaraz and J. Lopez, “Diagnosis Mechanism for Accurate Monitoring in
Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Comput. Stand. Interfaces, vol. 36, no. 3, pp.
501–512, Mar. 2014. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2013.10.
002
[83] K. Yigzaw, A. Michalas, and J. Bellika, “Secure and Scalable Statistical Com-
putation of Questionnaire Data in R,” IEEE Access, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–1,
2016.
[84] A. Michalas and R. Dowsley, “Towards Trusted eHealth Services in the Cloud,” in
2015 IEEE/ACM 8th International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing
(UCC), Dec 2015, pp. 618–623.
[85] F. Farha and H. Chen", “"Mitigating replay attacks with ZigBee solutions",” "Net-
work Security", vol. "2018", no. "1", pp. "13 – 19", "2018". [Online]. Available:
"http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1353485818300084"
[86] I. Vaccari, E. Cambiaso, and M. Aiello, “Remotely Exploiting AT Command
Attacks on ZigBee Networks,” Security and Communication Networks, vol. 2017,
p. 9. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/1723658.
[87] “XBee®/XBee - PRO S2C Zigbee® RF Module.” [Online]. Available:
https://www.digi.com/resources/documentation/digidocs/pdfs/90002002.pdf
[88] “HC-05 Documentation.” [Online]. Available: www.electronicaestudio.com/
docs/istd016A.pdf
[89] “CM5000 Documentation.” [Online]. Available: http://www.epssilon.cl/files/
EPS5000.pdf
73
[90] T. Chien, H. Nguyen Chan, and N. Thanh, “A comparative study on operating
system for Wireless Sensor Networks,” 01 2011.
[91] A. Dunkels, B. Gronvall, and T. Voigt, “Contiki - a lightweight and flexible
operating system for tiny networked sensors,” in 29th Annual IEEE International
Conference on Local Computer Networks, Nov 2004, pp. 455–462.
[92] N. Boulila, “Cyber-Physical Systems and Industry 4.0: Properties, Structure,
Communication, and Behavior,” 04 2019.
[93] “Arduino Documentation.” [Online]. Available: www.arduino.cc
[94] “Raspberry Pi Documentation.” [Online]. Available: www.raspberrypi.org
[95] “Raspbee Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://www.dresden-elektronik.
de
[96] “Scapy Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://scapy.net/
[97] D. Soni and A. Makwana, “A SURVEY ON MQTT: A PROTOCOL OF INTER-
NET OF THINGS(IOT),” 04 2017.
[98] R. T. Fielding, "Architectural styles and the design of network-based software ar-
chitectures,”(The Representational State Transfer (REST))Ph.D. dissertation, pp
76-85, Dept. Inf. Comput. Sci. Univ. California, Irvine, 2000. [Online]. Available:
http://www.ics.uci.edu/ fielding/pubs/ dissertation/top.htm.
[99] M. Amaran, M. Rohmad, L. Adnan, N. Mohamed, and H. Hashim, “Lightweight
security for MQTT-SN,” International Journal of Engineering and Technol-
ogy(UAE), vol. 7, pp. 223–226, 01 2018.
[100] “Universal Roobts UR3 Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://spectrum.
ieee.org/automaton/robotics/industrial-robots/universal-robots-ur3-robotic-arm
[101] “UpCloud Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://developers.upcloud.com/
[102] “InfluxDB Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.influxdata.com/
influxdb/v1.7/
[103] “Docker Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://docs.docker.com/v17.09/
[104] “Grafana Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://grafana.com/docs/
[105] “GR-IEEE802.15.4 Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://www.
wime-project.net/
[106] A. Dunkels, “Rime - a lightweight layered communication stack for sensor
networks.” 2007.
74 References
[107] P. Morgner, S. Mattejat, and Z. Benenson, “All Your Bulbs Are Belong to Us:
Investigating the Current State of Security in Connected Lighting Systems,” CoRR,
vol. abs/1608.03732, 2016. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1608.03732
[108] H. Tsague and B. Twala, Practical Techniques for Securing the Internet of Things
(IoT) Against Side Channel Attacks, 01 2018, pp. 439–481.
[109] A. Michalas and R. Murray, “Keep pies away from kids: A raspberry pi attacking
tool,” in Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Internet of Things Security and
Privacy, ser. IoTS&#38;P ’17. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017, pp. 61–62.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3139937.3139953
[110] A. Michalas, N. Komninos, and N. R. Prasad, “Mitigate DoS and DDoS attack in
mobile ad hoc networks,” International Journal of Digital Crime and Forensics
(IJDCF), vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 14–36, 2011.
[111] A. Michalas, N. Komninos, and N. Prasad, “Multiplayer game for ddos attacks
resilience in ad hoc networks,” in Wireless Communication, Vehicular Technology,
Information Theory and Aerospace Electronic Systems Technology (Wireless
VITAE), 2011 2nd International Conference on, Feb 2011, pp. 1–5.
[112] “Kippo Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://github.com/desaster/kippo
[113] “Cowrie Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://cowrie.readthedocs.io/en/
latest/index.html
[114] “Kajoney2 Documentation.” [Online]. Available: http://www.madirish.net/
[115] “MTPot Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://github.com/Cymmetria/
MTPot
[116] “Twisted-Honeypots Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://github.com/
lanjelot/twisted-honeypots
[117] “IoT-Telnet Honeypot.” [Online]. Available: https://github.com/Phype/
telnet-iot-honeypot
[118] “chroot Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://www.gnu.org/software/
coreutils/manual/html_node/chroot-invocation.html#chroot-invocation
[119] “HonTel Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://github.com/stamparm/
hontel
[120] “Honeyperl Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://sourceforge.net/p/
honeyperl/wiki/Home/
75
[121] “Twisted Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/
wiki/Documentation
[122] “OpenVPN Documentation.” [Online]. Available: https://openvpn.net/index.php/
access-server/docs.html
